Explanation: During our research for writing our doctoral thesis ***Philosophical Consolidation of the Theology of Dumitru Stăniloae***, in order to provide our research with as thorough as possible conclusions, we have experimentally edited and translated Stăniloae's book ***The Stance of Blaga on Christianity and* Orthodoxy,** that constituted his answer to the philosophy of Lucian Blaga. It has turned out that Stăniloae actually wrote a **philosophy book**, despite the philosophical vein being hidden under a thick layer of pamphlet-like style.
We reckon this manuscript as one more proof that Saint Priest Confessor Dumitru Stăniloae, the Restorer of the Christian theology, actually made religious philosophy and he was and still is (AD 2026) the greatest Christian Orthodox religious philosopher ever existed.

Dr. Marius Golea
Arad, 01. 27. 2026

The Stance of Blaga on Christendom and Orthodoxy

By Father Professor Dumitru Stăniloae

Experimental Reediting (by Marius Golea)

Introductory note: as we have been able to ascertain in the Chapter III of our thesis, Father Dumitru Stăniloae produced very strong philosophical arguments and pages of reflexive religious philosophy in his book wrote as a critique to philosopher Lucian Blaga's philosophy. In the same respect, in the mentioned chapter we have also ascertained that several readers who wrote on the Stăniloae-Blaga dispute, they were deceived by the layer of pamphlet-like paragraphs and because of the presence of the Christian apologetics which, to a certain extent, they masked and hid the actual value of the book which, in certain regards, it brought very serious and founded arguments against Blaga's philosophical assumptions. And that has inspired us to attempt an experimental rewriting of the mentioned book, by letting aside, in the experimental version, the fragments which, in our opinion, do not belong to the philosophy. Our intention is to provide the reader interested in the way which philosophy consolidated Stăniloae's theology in - or interested only in the philosophical arguments brought by Stăniloae against Blaga's philosophy -, with a purely

philosophical version of Stăniloae's book. We think that we have not been able to totally eliminate the pamphlet-like elements, because sometimes they were so integrated to the actual idea, so that eliminating them would have changed the meaning of that particular paragraph. We kindly remind our reader that we have translated and placed in the *Appendix no. V* of the present thesis, the full version of Stăniloae's book, as translated by us in the English language.

The reader is going to find within parentheses and in italics, our connection elements added by us in order to preserve the coherence of the text, after removing the parts mentioned above.

I. Romanian-Ism and Orthodoxy

Mister Lucian Blaga has recently written a book entitled *Religie și Spirit (Religion and Spirit)*[1], which he fixed in his point of view upon religion by and large, and upon Christendom and Orthodoxy especially.

(…)

(*Blaga granted and interview, in this respect, to Viața Newspaper on 26th of May 1942, which hid lordship wanted in, to give a supplement of clarification to his attitude towards Orthodoxy, consequently to the bewilderments which his book was met with, by the churchly circles*).

(*In his interview Blaga affirmed that the Orthodoxy is a religion that has been assimilated by the Romanian spirituality, from Greek and Byzantine origins, through the Romanian stylistic matrix. In answer to that, we argue that there was no time when the Romanian people had not been Orthodox and we also reckon that the Romanian spirituality had been growing up in an Orthodox environment, in an intertwining with Orthodox Christendom. So, we reckon Blaga's affirmation on the fact that the Orthodoxy has been assimilated by Romanians it holds no truth*.)

[1] First printed in the year 1942; in the year 1946 was first published *The Trilogy of the Values*, grouping *Art and Value* (first printed in the year 1939), *Religions and Spirit* (first printed in the year 1942), and *Science and Creation* (first printed in the year 1942).
IN the year 1987 *The Trilogy of the Values* is reedited and reprinted with a new taxonomy: *Science and Creation; Magical Thinking and Religion: I. On the Magical Thinking, II. Religions and Spirit*; and *Art and Value*.

(*We also argue that the Romanian stylistic matrix as defined by Blaga – an abyssal cause determining any spiritual production of a certain people - it seems to be actually an impediment in the way of assimilating any religion – the Orthodoxy in the given case. In addition to that, we also argue that Orthodoxy has the same characteristics regardless the peoples whom is belongs to.*)

(*Defining the meaning Blaga gives to the word assimilation it is seen by us as paramount, due to its implications, because this concept opens two directions of analysis. The first direction would be that defined by a process of assimilation that was total, the Orthodoxy would no longer be something foreign to the body of the Romanian spirituality, while, if the assimilation was not total, then the Orthodoxy would be rejected.*)

(*In our acceptation, the use of the word assimilation for describing the relation between the Romanian spirituality and Orthodoxy cannot be but extremely limited, and it also raises the problem regarding where Blaga's philosophy situated itself relatedly to Romanian-ism and Orthodoxy, because it risks being reckoned as opposed to these two. It seems to us that Blaga's philosophy remains unclear in its assumptions and it minimizes the importance of the Orthodoxy within the Romanian spirituality, by grating to Orthodoxy only a secondary place.*)

(*We only see the word assimilation appropriate to describe the process of conceptualization that took place by using Greek notions, in order to offer Christendom a terminology that made possible the Christendom to be conveyed.*)

(*On the other hand, it seems that Blaga attributed us the theologians the affirmation that we would reckon Orthodoxy as confounded to the totality of the Romanian-ism, which we did not. What we can affirm, though, it is that Orthodoxy influences, to a certain extent, all the production of the Romanian spirituality, be it art, science, or philosophy. This view of us states that the parts of any spirituality cannot exist isolated, but they are related to one another.*)

(*In what concerns the religion, Blaga defined it as a means for "self-totalization and self-surpassing of the human being in the ideal correlation to the ultimate elements of coordinates of the existential mystery by and large" (Religion and Spirit, p. 178, and other places too). There could not be a clearer expression of the idea that the religion - unlike any other occupation of the human spirit, and therefore unlike the philosophy as well – it claims the whole man and, so, the religion places under a light of itself, under the thought at God, the whole human being and, therefore, the whole life of the collectivities. In this respect we think as important to emphasize here that the life of a man or of a believer people is whole in another manner that is whole the life of an unbeliever, and the life of a people with a certain religion is whole in another manner that it is whole the life of another people having a different religion*.)

(*But in our opinion Blaga's philosophy makes, on one hand, the religion as an essential product of the human spirit – Blaga does not deny religion's necessary and totalitarian character. But as we are going to see further on, Blaga's philosophy is contrary to the Christendom itself, and therefore to Orthodoxy too, because of denying the Revelation that is the Christendom's foundation. And, by being contrary to Christendom, and therefore to Orthodoxy too, this philosophy is contrary to Romanian-ism as well*.)

II. Religion and Style

(…)

(*When developing his philosophical speculation on the stylistic matrix, Blaga states the style as deeper that the religion is, and that makes the religion only one among the many tendencies structured and determined by the style, so that the religion would have a more peripheral place in the spirituality of a people, while the spirituality's center of one people is identical to that people's style*.)

The style would be, according to Blaga, a sum of categories of the human spirit, which impede the human spirit from knowing the objective reality, by imposing to the human tendency to make contact with the

reality through knowledge or otherwise, diverse barriers, deformations, deviations, and subjective fading. The man knows only that there is a reality that differs from him, but what that reality is like, the man cannot know. The Great Anonymous, the center of the existence, He takes care for the man not to know absolutely anything of the reality's content, and that's why the Gret Anonymous has place in the man's being the system of stylistic categories, which the Great Anonymous exercises His censorship through. The man knows that there is a reality, but when to catch the content of that reality, the style makes him see something else than what it is, and the style makes the man to contrive certain *dissimulations* of the reality, while the reality remains a mystery forever. The supreme stage in knowledge is reached by the man when he realizes that he cannot know anything from reality, and that the reality is a mystery and everything the man cogitates about reality is a *myth*, it is a subjective construction. ("The thinkers who occupied themselves with the problem of the knowledge, attempting to determine it, they did not operate except with the terms: *subjectivity* or *objectivity*. Some of them thought, at most, at knowledge as at a mixt form, composed out of subjectivity plus objectivity. None of them conceived the possibility of an authentic *compromise*, namely of a subjectivity adjusted so that to *keep the place of the objectivity*" (Blaga 1934: 103-104)). This *knowledge*, which does not express the content of the reality, but it is only a subjective contrivance that keeps the place of the reality, it is called by Blaga as quasi-knowledge. The sole *objective* idea the man has is "the idea of existential mystery as such", namely the certitude that there is something real, but the man does not know what that is.

Each nation, or each region of nations, it has its own style, an own mode for dissimulating the reality. There are some elements which distinguish the *myths*, the conceptions, the attitudes of a people or of a group of people from the conceptions and attitudes of other peoples.

(…) (*Relatedly to what report stays the religion with the style in, Blaga says that the religion is exclusively a product of the style, and that would make the religion have a less central place in the human being*

than the style has). Blaga pronounced himself as the following: “The supra-conscience (of the mystics) is accomplished always within the same stylistic profound coordinates as the contrivances from culture are… The mystical certitude, with its values, it constitutes itself, unappealable, in stylistic frames, in those deep frames of the human spirit, which prove to be subjective, as they are variable” (Blaga (1) 1942: 212).

In our view, by interpreting the report between religion and style, as a report of subordination of the first term, it means looking at things too simplistically.

The religion – and Blaga admits that – it is partaker to that rushing of the human spirit towards the transsubjective reality, which the transcendent censorship deviates it, it makes it to be satisfied with dissimulations. Out of the whole philosophy of Blaga it turns out – and there was no other possibility – that the foundation of the human being is that *Drang*[2] towards reality, towards knowing the reality, and toward contacting the reality.

The censorship is only a defense measure taken by the Great Anonymous facing this rushing in of the human being, either for defending Himself or in order to defend the human being as such. Consequently, not the censorship is the primary and positive element of our being, but that is the momentum towards reality. The censorship could not be conceived as a purpose in itself, but only as a brake against that rushing in. “The Great Anonymous has stuck, generously, the postulate to the human knowledge, the unconditional imperative of the integral *truth*. The individual knowledge longs for truth, being prey to a deep momentum rooted right in the *act of transcending*, which possibility it is endowed with. Still, the Great Anonymous did not allow the accomplishing of this momentum towards truth, except in the idea-negative of the mystery. Any other knowledge is dissimulation, through censorship, of the transcendence. *The Great Anonymous has placed within us the irrevocable urge towards “truth”, an urge founded on itself the nature of the knowledge, but the Anonymous refuses us the truth,*

[2] German for *urge (impulse, drive)*.

through His transcendent censorship. We are categorically urged towards and categorically stopped from the same thing" (Blaga 1934: 203).

(…)

(*We understand from the paragraph from above that not the tendency towards reality is placed within man in order to set the style in work, but inversely, the style is placed within man in order to fence the man's rushing in towards reality. The rushing in towards reality is like a wave, while the style is the apparatus deviating and dispersing that wave; the rushing in towards reality is the wolf's hunger, while the style is that one throwing to the wolf illusions instead of food. The stylistic matrix is not the spring from within us, but it is the filter placed in the spring's way*.)

(…) (*The considerations from above cause the need for analyzing the place the religion holds in this rushing in towards reality*). Blaga admits the fact that the religion owns a prim order place. Unlike other human tendencies towards reality, the religion expresses the man's thirst for the highest regions of the reality, for the ultimate coordinates of the existence. Only the metaphysics expresses a similar tendency of the man, but the metaphysics does not express such a tendency of the whole man, but only of the man's knowledge. Anyway, the religion is not less than the metaphysics is, but it rather is more, according to Blaga. "Here is the place us to show what the religion is different by, from the other man's revelatory attempts, namely from metaphysics, from art, from sciences… In art, the revelatory attempts do not necessarily concern the ultimate elements or the coordinates themselves of the mysteries of the existence, but they concern any mystery and any aspect of the mystery. But, between metaphysics and religion, we ascertain some similarity of interests, and sometimes even a similarity of means; this is for the metaphysics tends, as the religion tends too, to reveal the ultimate elements, the coordinates of the existence themselves. The metaphysics participates, preponderantly or exclusively on the way of the *knowledge*, to the order revealed by the man to himself. Through religion, the human

being self-totalizes in front of the order she/he reveals to herself/himself, for the human being participates to the order in question with the knowledge, with the affects etc." (Blaga 1942(1): 180-181).

(…) That means that in religion it is expressed more radically, more passionately, the rushing in of the human being towards reality, namely its deeps, and its substance. And this fact, as also that the religion is not satisfied with regardless what reality as in the case of the science, but the religion tends towards the ultimate reality, it shows more than an accidental difference between religion, on one hand, and art, science, and metaphysics, on the other hand; that shows an essential difference, one that Blaga has not explained at all, but he was content with only ascertaining those two notes characteristic to religion. (…)

The religion, by being the most passionate rushing in of the human beings towards reality, namely towards the most-principal reality, and, by and large, the rushing in towards reality being the man's fundamental substance, it follows that the religion is the most central expression of this fundamental human substance.

The religion is deeper than the style is, and the religion is more-one with the human being than the style is.

(…) (*We can identify in Blaga's philosophy the fact that the religion would be the cause for the transcendental censorship imposed by The Great Anonymous, in order to defend Himself against the man's need to know the ultimate reality*). If the man's rushing in towards reality had aimed only more modest regions, for instance as the science do, the Great Anonymous would not have had any reason to attach to it the censorial brake of the tyle, because He would not have felt Himself threatened by the man's indiscretion. If the man had not had the tendency of knowing the Great Anonymous, consequently, if there had not existed within man the religious impulse, the style would have been meaningless. (…) The cause which the Great Anonymous placed within man the reins of the tyle for, it is the man's religious tendency. The man's religiousness is, consequently, the deeper cause of the style and not vice versa. Once that thirst for Absolute had not existed within man – as

manifested through religion – the style would not have had any reason to exist. (…) (*This could be seen as an internal contradiction of Blaga's philosophy, because by weakening the importance of the man's religiousness, the style will become unimportant too*).

We could conclude out of the previous considerations that: consequently, the Romanian spirituality cannot be conceived without Orthodoxy, because of not being possible to conceive the Romanian spirituality as a style that functions without having an object, but the Romanian spirituality can only be conceived as a style applied essentially to the deeper religious impulse, having as result the Orthodoxy.

Of course, we do not know any of the manifestations of our individual or ethnic being, but as determined by the *stylistic matrix*. But it would be wrong if we affirmed that we did not know anything outside the stylistic matrix. What we know about us, it is a whole formed by this impulse towards reality - whose heart is the religiousness – and by the stylistic categories.

Though Blaga did not trust the witness of the universal-human conscience on the objective character of so many of our knowledge, he still admitted at least the witness of the conscience on the principial existence of an objective reality - though in his view the reality is not cognoscible – and on our being's tendency towards *truth*, namely towards entering the connection with the objective reality. Though Blaga used other words, he still affirmed that the whole content of our knowledge is the subjective creation of the stylistic matrix, despite he admitted that through it we know, at least, the fact that the transsubjective reality exists. Our knowledge, as shaped by the stylistic factors, it does not comprise anything positive out of reality, but it still is a sign of the reality, it is a proof that the reality objectively exists.

By that, Blaga admitted that our religious and metaphysical manifestations are not exclusively the product of the stylistic matrix, but they are the product of our deeper – but deviated – impulse towards reality.

Thus, our Orthodoxy does not represent only an arbitrary product of the Romanian style, a style that, consequently, it could dispense itself of such production, but there is in Orthodoxy an element that is deeper that the style is, one that is necessary to the existence and the functioning of the style. The style especially needs the Orthodoxy in order the style to manifest and function; without Orthodoxy, we would not know, and, therefore, a Romanian style did not exist either. The Romanian spirituality is being essentially revealed through Orthodoxy.

Blaga could object that: this element that is deeper than and necessary to the Romanian style, it would be the religiousness, and not the Orthodoxy; the Orthodoxy, as religious modality determined by the Romanian style, it is due to this style, it is subordinated to this style, and therefore is a less essential part of the Romanian-ism, and one could make abstraction of it, or one even can take attitude against it in the works expressing the 'Romanian'[3].

Such and objection would be superfluous. Not only the indeterminate religiousness is an essential element for the constitution and the existence of the Romanian (adj., o. n.), but also the religiousness as Orthodoxy.

As consequence to his theory about style, Blaga must admit that the Romanian ethnicity cannot know and live the religiosity in another form than Orthodoxy, the Orthodoxy not being else but the general religiosity bearing the fingerprints of the Romanian style.

On one hand, the religiousness as general human impulse, it is necessary for the constitution and for the functioning of the Romanian style, and it is deeper than the Romanian style. On the other hand, this necessity takes, under the influence of the style, the form of the Orthodoxy.

If we said that the religiousness, the momentum towards the supreme reality is deeper than the human being, than the style, we would

[3] Here we have, in the source text, an adjective: "românesc". We are operating this disambiguation here, because one can get confused by the fact that in English both noun and adjective are: "Romanian".

not mean that is spatially deeper, or chronologically more original, but we meant that is essential to the man, more characteristic, more necessary to the man. In reality, concretely the religiousness is always within man together with the man's style, as a whole: the Religiousness of the Romanian people is, concretely, only as Orthodoxy. The Romanian essentiality has an Orthodox form. The fact that is *ours* must not be a motif for imagining that we have created it and therefore we can renounce to it, either by replacing it for something analogue, or by leaving its place empty. Without this *deep* we no longer can have something of *ours*. We will lose on ourselves.

(…)

III. A Religious Anti-Christian Philosophy

The anti-Christian character of the philosophy of Blaga starts form the gnoseological theory of his Lordship, one doubled by a corresponding vision on the center of the existence, of The Great Anonymous.

From gnoseological perspective, we have seen that his Lordship admits a transsubjective reality, but he does not admit the possibility of knowing any positive element of that transsubjective reality. All our knowledge is either *quasi-knowledge* – namely a product *keeping the place* of the real knowledge, or it is *knowledge-negative*[4] - that is a real transcending of the subjectivity and not consisting of anything else but only of a conscience of the reality as an impossible to be known mystery. Through quasi-knowledge the man imagines that he knows the reality, and he grants his knowledge an adequation to reality; through the knowledge-negative the man realizes that all his ideas upon reality do not comprise anything out of reality, but just for that this knowledge-negative is closer to reality. ("It will be conceded to us, without any reserve, that the existential mystery is, both through quasi-knowledge

[4] We have adopted this *knowledge-negative*, in order to preserve the source text's intention to convey the *negative* as a noun. In this case *negative* is not an adjective. We can frame this syntagm either as an *apposition* or as a *parataxis*.

and through the knowledge-negative, fully *defended*. Through quasi-knowledge, which must be regarded as a package of dissimulations, the mystery is defended, because within the frame of the quasi-knowledge the mystery is not shown but as subjectively masked. Through the knowledge-negative the mystery is defended for it is reached only as *mystery*" (Blaga 1934: 157).

The question is, regarding this theory: what purpose would have a knowledge that is not a knowledge? And, secondly, the endeavor towards a progress in knowledge and in the conscience of the man that he is partaker to that progress, do not become all of these a simple illusion?

Blaga answered: the knowledge will be meaningful if it is not a positive knowledge. ("The quasi-knowledge means a transposition of some vital psychic vital phenomena on the staves[5] of the spirit. But we are dealing here with a *quasi-achievement* of the spirit and not with an *authentic achievement* of the spirit. The negative knowledge, through the idea of the existential mystery, it is, in exchange, an *authentic achievement* or *effulguration* of the spirit. Despite being incomplete, it is not less real." (Blaga 1934: 194-195)). On the other hand, through this degradation of the knowledges, a degradation forced by The Great Anonymous "in the creatural domain, they become *positive* values on the complex plan of the creation. So, there are *ideal values* which, in the field of the existence, they become *positive factors* only through *degradation*" (Blaga 1934: 291).

Regardless how much we have been searching in *The Transcendent Censorship* published by Blaga – who exposes his metaphysical theory of the knowledge – we have not been able to find any word which to result out of, that in our knowledge there is comprised any element which to express something positive out of the content of the objective reality. In such conditions, it is natural that Blaga does not speak about a progress of the knowledge, except towards admitting that we know nothing. We reach the central point on knowledge when we totally free ourselves form the illusion that we know something, except the fact that there is a

[5] He is using *staves* here in the musical meaning.

reality. The culmination of the knowledge equals to *the full integration into mystery*, to the *potentiation of the mystery* in front of our conscience. Of course, that is a progress to be conscious about the mystery of the reality, but on the other hand, in this consciousness is not comprised any crumb out of the reality's size.

We do not find at Blaga either the specification of a certain report between reality and our gnoseological productions. Blaga does not tell us either which positive report stays each stylistic matrix in, with the reality, namely if there is not, though, a certain positive or negative correspondence between an aspect of the reality and the templates of a certain style, or if the reality does not have a determinative role in constituting certain or certain style.

Overall, we cannot know if our subjective products still express, somehow, something positive out of reality. Out of the accent placed by Blaga on the integration into mystery through knowledge-negative, as our last possibility, it seems that is not comprised in what we know, anything, in any way, out of reality – this is because, if there had been anything comprised out of reality in what we know, it would have had to give us the laws which the reality is mirrored and deformed within us according to.

The conception of Blaga is some sort of agnosticism differing from the classical agnosticism, through the thick accent it places on the mystery and on the *creator* role of the nescience; or it is some sort of poetical Kantianism, one differing form the proper Kantianism, by the fact that Kant systematically analyzes the laws which the knower subject transposes the reality in his forms according to, while Blaga did not analyze of the report between the stylistic matrix and reality, or he does not admit a real joining between objectivity and subjectivity, or, finally, he does not occupy himself with researching the laws which the objectivity is modified by the subject according to. (the philosophical speculation of Blaga, t. n.[6]) it is a system of arbitrary affirmations. It is a poetical Kantianism by the fact that it grants equally justification to the

[6] English language translator's note.

myth, to the poetry, and to the systematic cogitation to *know*, or, rather, to not known the reality.

It is true that Blaga described diverse kinds of knowledge and diverse stylistic matrixes, but he did not show the *report, the connections,* and *the laws of the connections* between those kinds of knowledge and stylistic matrixes and the reality. Blaga is content with not admitting any kind of presence of the reality in our knowledge forms either in the respective styles, or, anyway, he affirms that we cannot know anything about the mode of this presence.

On the ground of this gnoseology, would have there still been possible a Christendom? The Christian doctrine has many connection possibilities with the human cogitation and with the overall reality. If Blaga stopped himself here, it would be possible – not without some difficulties – this gnoseology to be interpreted as being appliable only to the natural man[7], while the Christendom, by creating another kind of life, to be seen as a frame which the access to reality is possible in. Though Blaga derived, in *The Transcendent Censorship*, the barriers which impede the man to know anything positive, out of a jealous and fearing not to be overthrown Great Anonymous, the Christian theology, with some lenience, it could have admitted that such a report is possible between man and God, after the man's falling into sin, but when God decides to save the man, He allows the man to come close to Him. (We are just saying that is the place to wonder ourselves what could have reached Blaga to speak so precisely like, about the great Anonymous, after the gnoseology had taken him to the result that the same Great Anonymous does not allow anybody to know anything positive. Blaga deduced the stylistic brakes out of the Great Anonymous. Or, the stylistic brakes do not allow us to know anything real, being included here the Great Anonymous too. What could Blaga base his assertions about the knowledge brakes on The Great Anonymous like? Itself the ground of these brakes is flimsy too. Blaga could have been consistent in his

[7] The human being who did not know the Christendom.

cogitation if he simply had admitted the existence of the knowledge brakes, without taking any step forwards.

Then: It is right that Blaga ensured to himself the liberty of *philosophical* construction by affirming that the spirit owed to search for the truth, but - for Blaga has reached, to the ultimate point of the knowledge, namely at the evidence that we do not know anything positive, but everything that we know is a subjective construction – it would be his duty to his fellow humans, who could believe in the truth of the positive content of the system of Blaga – him to clearly tell us something: everything I have built it is also empty of any element that would correspond to reality; what we surely know, it is that we do not know anything, except that there is a mysterious reality.

But Blaga went too far when he extended not only over the religion by and large, but explicitly upon Christendom, his theory about the totally subjective character of any spiritual content.

What is the extent Blaga's thesis matches other religions to, we are going to see when scrutinizing the being of the religion by and large, in comparison to the definition Blaga gave to religion, and also in comparison to what results as religious element out of his gnoseology.

Regarding the Christendom, Blaga adopted a stance of articulated and categorical opposition, when he showed that he aprioristically does not admit the divine Revelation, and this not only generally, but by referring himself specifically to Christendom, in his book *Religion and Spirit*. (…)

Reached at this point, we should show the stance of Blaga from two perspectives: *a)* by underscoring that Blaga actually denies the godlike Revelation even to Christendom; and *b)* by proving the fact that the foundation of the Christendom is the conviction about the divine Revelation. (…)

(…)

We are giving here a few quotes which one can ascertain out of, that Blaga does not admit a divine revelation neither to Christendom, by applying to Christendom too the stylistic gnoseology deduced out of an

evil and fearful Great Anonymous. By treating the Christendom as mixed with the other religions, Blaga categorized the Christendom with the same modes of expression used by him, by affirming indiscriminately, about all of them, that "they always stay, under the empire of the stylistic categories of the human spirit, obeying those stylistic categories with the same docility, as all the culture manifestations do too" (Blaga 1942(1): 188). "Any religion, because of being crystalized as spiritual creation, it is submitted to the stylistic determinations" (1942(1): 180). But these stylistic categories not only shape a religious knowledge that is real, but they even produce that religions knowledge. Paraphrasing Baise Pascal, Blaga affirms that: "the mystical certitude… is not the effect of an ultimate objectivity, of a positive transcending" (Blaga 1942(1): 212) so that the mystical certitude is a product from within subjectivity. The thesis that the stylistic templates not only shape the truth content in a spirit beyond the truth, it is argued by Blaga limpidly, when he polemizes with Rudolf Otto who, by finding, on one hand, the category of the *sacred* as something fundamental in religion, and on the other hand, the category of the *sacred* not being possible to have its origin within the subject, he deduces out of it that the man who intuits the *sacred* he is, actually, in report with an objective reality. (…) (*We think that Blaga mistakes by reiterating Otto's forerunners' assumptions on the subjectivity of the religion, which were proven wrong by Otto himself*.) Blaga says: "The thinker (Otto) wants to provide the religion too with an *objectivity*, or with an *indisputable legitimacy*" (Blaga 1942(1): 196). After a certain *demonstration*, Blaga opposes Otto's will to found the religion in objectivity: "*Behold why any undertaking for legitimizing the religion in an objective sense, it is dangerous. Luckily, the religion does not need this supposed objectivity, in order to justify its existence. The religion has the same legitimacy titles as any other culture manifestation of the mankind, but it also has one more title than those ones*" (Blaga 1942(1): 203).

In these rows, under the appearance that something positive would be granted to religion, it actually is taken away any foundation from the

religion. We affirm that because in our opinion the culture's title as defined by Blaga is that of being a mere play *creator* of artifices of the human spirit, in his tendency *towards truth*. (Something similar to the inconsistent play of stars coming to brief *existence* under the close eyelids). The culture can exist without the conviction about an objectivity; the religion cannot. The religion cannot be legitimate as a gratuitous play of the spirit, as the culture is legitimate. If the religion's legitimacy had been reduced only to that, the religion would have simply no longer been a religion; there would have existed only the culture. So, the religion and the culture cannot exist with the same subjective legitimacy. This is a proof that the religion is something totally else than the culture. Blaga, by identifying the religion to the culture, he shows, essentially, amongst other things, that he does not grant to religion any right to objectivity, as he does regarding the culture too. (But we are going to treat about this when specifically debating the problem of the religion). Even the particle *self-* (totalization – surpassing) used by Blaga in order to give the religion a definition, it shows that Blaga conceives the religion as a man's product.

(…) (*In order to argue our assertion about Blaga's vision on Revelation, we are giving here*) his note from the page no. 190: "Regarding the divine revelation which so many present and past religions refer to, it actually remains a problem of metaphysical nature, and from metaphysical angle, any reader can deduce our attitude out of the conception we developed on other occasion, regarding the transcendental censorship and the transcendental brakes. Since, in our conception, the whole care of The Great Anonymous is just that of impeding the human being (through the transcendental censorship) from interpreting in adequate and positive terms the mysteries of the existence, we cannot really see what the role would have a revelation whose initiative to belong to the same Great Anonymous. We cannot really imagine that The Great Anonymous takes with one hand to give with another hand" (Blaga 1942(1): 25).

Finally, consistent with the whole his conception, Blaga declares that Jesus Christ – Who is in the Christian teaching the consummation of the Revelation of God, namely Himself the Only Begotten Son of the Father descended among us, after He took human existence -, as a simple man, one divinized by the ardor of a group which the messianic myth was formed, in time, as a human subjective production, in the likeness of all human intellectual and mythical products, and therefore not having anything out of the positive content of the divine reality, and without the affirmative intervention of the divinity.

As God Marduk of the Babylonians is the mystical product of a messianic expectation, likewise the *divinity* of Jesus is a mythical adding, upon His simple humanity. The myth has been born on human way. The prophets, whom this myth come to existence through, they "they only think about themselves as being some kind of organs of God" (Blaga 1942(1): 141), but they are actually not. Everything took place naturally, as it did in Babylon, except there the mystery had a more astral character, while at Jews it appeared more humanized. Here, the god must not be a star, but a man. "*The messianic myth had truly taken in possession a human being and it had been accomplished through that human person*" (Blaga 1942(1): 144), namely they who had had that expectation, they had been appeased in their conviction that in Jesus their expectation had been fulfilled.

It is true that Blaga grants Jesus *a supra-human* power (Blaga 1942(1): 144), because, otherwise, not even Blaga could have explained why Jesus's contemporaries did not reckon any other of their fellow human as God. But *supra-human* power means, in the context this term is framed and in ideas consonance with the whole book *Religion and Spirit*, and with the whole philosophy of Blaga, a simple potentiation within the limits of the human, but not something radically different from the human; something resembling the Nietzschean *supra-man*, or resembling to the *supra-conscience* of the mystics, which Blaga categorically says about, that it is not something above the human nature. ("One can admit only that, really so, the mystics accomplish a state of hyper- or supra-

conscience, of an intensity that banishes away into shadow all the state of usual conscience. But we cannot admit that this is the effect of an ultimate objectivity, of a positive transcending, of a contact or of a confluence with the Absolute" (Blaga 1942(1): 212)).

The Christendom is, though, built on the foundation of the Revelation and, specifically, on the consummate Revelation of God embodied as man. With this conviction, with this truth, the Christendom stands or falls.

We are going to underscore the inappropriate elements which Blaga is based on, in his attempt to undermine the revelational foundation of the Christendom, namely to uprise against Jesus Christ – God. This is because, if Jesus Christ had not been God, He would have not resurrected and He would have not saved us; consequently, the whole Christians' faith would have been a pitiful illusion.

IV. The Definition of the Religion

(…)

(*Blaga reached to reject the Christian Revelation by further developing his philosophical speculation, namely by starting from the bases he laid down by asserting the traits of The Great Anonymous and the transcendental censorship. Consequently, Blaga gave to religion a definition he subjectively composed, one that does not comprise all the elements specific to religion, specifically not the elements of the Christendom. A definition of the religion must be composed in such a manner that to match the whole variety of the religions, consequently to match the Christendom too. The scientific objectivity does not allow to be taken - in order to compose the definition of a religion - only the favorite religion and all the other religions to be misinterpreted by starting from that point of view.*)

(…)

If one must pay a special attention to a religion, while establishing a definition to the religion, of course that would be the religion having

clearer constitutive elements, less blunts and degenerated, and not vice versa, as there one would want to define the man by starting from a deaf, mentally challenged human being, or if one would take a baren tree in order to establish the definition of a tree. This was the mistake Blaga committed, following the example of so many of his antecessors in being adversaries to religion, by not paying the main attention to Christendom, but to some superficial elements belonging to Hinduism and Buddhism. Blaga chased curiosities in religion, and unessential aspects, and not what is permanent and essential to religion. (…)

Of course, Blaga tried to get rid of this methodological requirement, by affirming that all religions have the same value and the same level. It was easy to him to made such an affirmation once - according to Blaga - all religions are based on an illusion. But this affirmation is a simple bravado in the face of the obvious reality. The fetishism of the African tribes, or even the Greek-Roman pantheism with those deities full of petty passions, they cannot be placed on the same level with the Christendom, except by somebody who stubbornly utters an affirmation that is contrary to all evidences. (Besides, the whole domain of the reality shows us that the things of same kind – comprised in a species of in a notion – are not qualitatively equal).

After these methodological considerations, we are going to proceed to an examination of the definition of the religion as Blaga formulate it, and we are going to present the insufficiencies of that definition and the elements which Blaga has left aside, because they did not fit his preconceived scheme. We are going to show what all the essential elements of the religion appear like, in the clearest mode in Christendom, and what, consequently, the other religions are like, in some concern, degenerate forms of a primordial religion which was closer to Christendom, and on another concern, the other religions are incomplete expressions of the true religion which they are tending towards without realizing it, a religion that has been accomplished through Christendom.

The religion, according to Blaga, it expresses the subjective striving for "*self-totalization and self-exceeding of the human being in*

ideal correlation with the last elements of coordinates of the existential mystery by and large, which the man reveals to himself or which he reckons them as revealed, to himself" (Blaga 1942(1): 178).

Between religion and metaphysics, Blaga did not find other difference, except that in the frame of the religion the man tends with the whole his being towards the ultimate coordinates of the existence, while within the coordinates of the metaphysics the man tends towards the ultimate coordinates of the existence only through knowledge. "*The human being feels an inclination or necessity for participating, in a way or another, with all his faculties and aptitudes to the order given in the same time with the revealing of the last elements or coordinate of the mystery of the existence... The metaphysics participates preponderantly or exclusively on the way of the "knowledge" to the order, revealed by the man to himself. Through religion the human being self-totalizes in front of the order which he reveals to himself, namely the human being participates to the order in question with the knowledge, with the affects, with the will, with the intuition* etc." (Blaga 1942(1): 181).

Consequently, Blaga does not see between religion and metaphysics but a difference of extensive order. The religion is a metaphysics which the other faculties of the human spirit are added to. Both in metaphysics and in religion it is about a *revealing* produced by man, so that, under this report, Blaga does not see any difference between metaphysics and religion. Even more, for the participation of the human being as characteristic element of the religion, it takes place in the favor of an order firstly given through the self-revelatory knowledge, the religion has as its center, says Blaga, also the metaphysics. The religion is, consequently, as we have just said, a metaphysics which the other parts of the human being are associated to.

It would suffice us to show the essential insufficiency of this theory by asking the simple question: why the man cannot participate to any metaphysics with all his faculties and parts of his nature? Or, why the philosophical systems chase aways on one another without waking up the total participation of some larger circles of the mankind, despite the

whole noisy propaganda their architects take care of, in order to animate and guide it? If that had been the case, we would have had equally numerous religions as many metaphysics have been or will be built up.

Actually, what does it mean that, in metaphysics, that the man participates "to the order he reveals to himself', only through knowledge? *That is nothing else but the fact that the man does not feel himself claimed by that order*, because of not being convinced about its reality, or because of not having the power for claiming the reality. The conscience of the philosopher builder of a system, or of the adherents to his system, *their conscience does not have the* **conviction** *that the ultimate reality is as he imagines it or that that reality had the quality of claiming the man*.

Towards metaphysics, the man – even him who has built that metaphysics up – remains in a conscience that everything is a play of his own spirit. It is, at most, only *possible* that the reality to be so, but he has no certitude on that. If he still was sure that the ultimate reality is like he judged it, but, despite all these, he does not feel himself claimed by that reality, the cause could not consist of anything else but of the fact that he does not conceive that metaphysics as having the quality or the power to claim the man.

Consequently, the metaphysics lacks two elements which the religion, unlike the metaphysics, it has them: 1. The certitude of the ultimate reality in the way it is conceived and 2. The quality of this reality of claiming the man, namely a certain feature that elevates it from indifference or from automatism and uniformity, so that is has a certain capacity of behaving depending on the case, as the man behaves too; and this is not else but a person-like character of the ultimate reality. Without these two characteristic elements, there is no religion and one cannot explain why the man participates totally to a certain order within the frame of the religion, while in the frame of the metaphysics he does not the same.

The way which the two lacks are combined in, in metaphysics, it varies. Sometimes, the certitude about the reality imagined by the man

can be quite high. If the man still does not behave in total self-engagement towards the reality he has imagined, it is because he does not imagine that ultimate reality as having a person-like character (freedom of conscience), but as an automatic law or as a blind matter etc. towards which he vainly attempts to behave himself differently. He thinks that no matter how he behaves, it will obtain the same result. Some other times, the philosopher can reach in his metaphysics the idea or a somewhat person-like reality, but then he misses the certitude about the existence of that reality. Still, most of the times, the metaphysics presents both shortcomings.

Being a play of the spirit, the metaphysics does not determine the man to behave, within its frame, with the absolute seriousness and with the conscience that his destiny depends on that behavior, as in case or religion.

1. Regarding the first element characteristic to religion, namely: the certitude of the religious man, that means the man's *faith* in the ultimate reality and his faith in that ultimate reality's way of being, as he knows it. There is no religion without faith. Blaga has removed from the definition of the religion right this characteristic element of the religion. I might be that Blaga didn't realize that he undermined the religion, by arguing the unreality of its object of faith – and thus removing the faith itself – because the religion would not consist of faith but of the total engagement of the man towards an idea of his. The neglection and the totally removal the faith from the definition of the religion as built up by Blaga, it can be seen, for instance, out of the way Blaga explains the term of *ideal correlation*: "*What does this expression want to mean, in "ideal correlation"?... The self-totalization or self-exceeding of the human being..., it is determined like an idea is able to determine the human being and like the human being with his structures is able to determine the content and the form of an idea*" (Blaga 1977: 473). We think that we can identify in Blaga's assertions the influence of Feuerbach, according to whom the religion is a manifestation of the man's egotism and of his phantasy. Through egotism, the man wants to get rid of his own

shortcoming, and through phantasy the man established an ideal target him to reach. Usually, in religion the man "idealized his own being". He firstly creates an image of God, as his heart wills, and then the man shapes his own being according to the God's image he created. Let's compare this to Blaga's expressions: "Due to this correlation it turns out that all *Mioritic* mythical or metaphysical contrivances induces in *any* religion answer - more or less – to some plain or subconscious desires of the human being. *In any religion the man contrives a myth or a certain metaphysics in his own image and likeness, but also this myth or this metaphysics contained by any religion, it tends to shape the man in its image and likeness*" (Blaga 1942(1): 83).

At Blaga the theory of Feuerbach is intertwined with the Spencer's positivism, as the theories of Feuerbach and Spencer are in a tight connection. Spencer, as Auguste Compte too, reckons the religion as a product of phantasy, or of a myth. But while Compte's consistent positivism declares that in this myth there is no truth, and therefore the religion must be removed ('Alle Religion ist aus dem Mythos erzeught unde muss mit dem Mythos zugrunde gehen', as H. Scholz interpets the positivism conception, *Religionsphilosophie*, Berlin, p. 42), Spencer affirms that the religion as myth translates improperly a truth, namely the idea of an Absolute that exists. Anyway, the religion is a human product and, according to Spencer, between religion and metaphysics there is an essential identity, so that Spencer too does not see the faith as a distinctive element of the religion.

Blaga's point of view on religion is but a Feuerbach-Spencer combination.

(…)

(*Blaga seems to have adopted a favorable and generous attitude towards religion by deeming the religion as a necessity of the human nature, but he actually said that religion is only an illusion and the religion can exist without faith and only as a report of the man towards his own ideas, exactly as in metaphysics*.)

(…)

Let’s look, therefore, at the great contradiction Blaga is in: on one hand, he affirms that the religion is an essential side of the human culture and a spirit that not creates the religion will not live in the plenitude of his creator powers, and on the other hand, (Blaga, o. n.) by wanting to convince the people that the things which they believe in are simple creator ideas, and therefore illusions, he attempts to remove any possibility of religion’s existence, namely of an essential function of the human spirit. (The religion which Blaga speaks about is no longer a religion. In his system there is no place for religion. What we have understood in the chapter *Religion and Spirit* as a deeper than the style impulse, it is not a religion, it is metaphysics. Blaga wrongly calls that impulse, and we have highlighted the deeper nature of that impulse than that of the style, only in order to show another contradiction of Blaga, one that subordinates, on the other hand, the religion to the style). In this deep contradiction has Blaga fallen, because of the wrong definition he has given to religion, in his tendency of plucking the faith out of it, and because of his attempt to identify the religion to metaphysics.

We have seen that because of this definition, Blaga could not explain why the man does not accompany any metaphysics - which he reveals to himself a certain order through – with all the faculties of his being.

Blaga would want to include the faith among and on the plan of those “diverse faculties and attitudes” which, after the man has built a metaphysics, they come to adhere to it. But by that, he did not answer why the man cannot participate with all his faculties, therefore with his faith too, to any metaphysics? Out of this, we can see that the faith is not a simple “faculty or attitude” among the other *faculties*, which come to approve a metaphysics, but the faith is more profound than all of them, it is something that gives *the knowledge* a certitude too, and it forces every man to participate to that order.

Blaga remained at the surface in the definition he gave to religion.

Blaga saw that the man participates within religion with all his faculties to a certain order acknowledged by conscience, but he did not

attempt to explain how comes that the man participates to a certain *metaphysics*, but the man does not participate to the actual metaphysics. The more profound cause is the *faith*, and, though the *faith* is obvious in all religions, Blaga overlooked it (…). (*In our view the Religion has as its characteristic element the strong and the unshaken faith in the truth of what it upholds*).

(…)

(*We argue that something else is the definition of the religion and something else is the problem of the religion's truth. The definition of the religion must comprise everything that characterizes the religion as phenomenon, as psychological, historical, and social reality*. *We think that Blaga proceeded to define the religion while having a negative prejudgment about the religion's truth, so that he no longer was able to provide an objective definition*).

(…)

The definition of the religion must comprise all those elements which the religion cannot be encountered without, as specific phenomenon in the human life, namely all those conditions which are necessary for religion to be constituted and to last. Philosopher Heinrich Scholz says: "As fundamental elements of the religion it can be principally admitted only those proven to be necessary and sufficient conditions for its existence; this is for the question about the existence of the religion coincides, in its strict sense, to the question about those conditions of religion's existence which are equally necessary and sufficient for religion's existence" (*Religionsphilosophie*, Berlin, 1922, p. 31).

(…)

(*Such absolutely necessary element for the existence of the religion is the faith of that religion's adherents in the realities preached by that religion*).

*

2. As we have seen before, among the conditions necessary to religion's existence, in addition to faith there enters also the conviction about the capacity of the ultimate realities of claiming the man, namely a certain feature that elevates those realities out of indifference and automatism, and that also means a certain capacity to behave towards the man depending on the way the man behaves towards them. Consequently, without claiming that we have found on all stages of the mankind the clear conscience of the person-like character applied to the ultimate realities, these realities are, actually, conceived by any religious soul, as having some person traits. If the ultimate reality had not been conceived like so, the faith would not have power to make the man *to totally adhere*[8] (o. h.) to it. The faith is not properly-said faith, and it cannot constitute a religion, except by fulfilling this condition. The faith and the person-like character of the ultimate reality are inseparable.

(…)

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3. Besides the *certitude of the faith* and besides *a superior character of the full automatism and of the pure passiveness*, attributed to the ultimate realities of the existence, any religion comprises also some specific and absolutely necessary elements.

The first, which we pay attention to, it is a certain *difference made by any believer among these ultimate realities having a clearer or more obscure character, and the nature*.

Neither the science nor the metaphysics made this distinction. The science occupies itself with what perfectly fits the order of the physical or psychic nature. The metaphysics, though oriented towards the ultimate bases of the reality, it does not conceive those but in a continuity of substance with something that is comprised in the order of

[8] We have chosen this traductological solution for translating the original: "*to make the man adhere in a totalitarian manner*". We think we have identified here a case justifying the need for intra-lingual translation, because, later on, the word *totalitarian* came to define the totalitarian regimes: fascism, communism (all dictatorships actually).

the natural. If there occurs sometimes some metaphysical system that discerns between the great order of the material and its basis, usually that metaphysics originates out of a religion, and it does nothing else but expressing in metaphysical language a religious faith. (Of course, the author of such metaphysical system can be only a philosopher, namely he does not have the power of believing in his system, despite that system being built on the basis of a religion. Likewise, those who read that system can adopt the same behavior as in case of a pure philosophy).

Speaking in this connection to the nature's order, which any religion differs its object of faith from, we include in it also the inner reality of the man and his character as person.

But the realities forming the object of faith in religion are not only different from the entire order of the nature, but they are also superior to it.

This distinctive note superior to the order of the nature, of the ultimate realities preached by any religion, it is in its generality what one understands through the *attribute of divine, of divinity* of those superior or supreme coordinates of the existence.

It might be that the divine reality to be seen in an ultimate and intimate connection with the nature and its objects.

Though, in any religion there is the conscience that the divine reality is something else than the nature takes a such. He who does not notice this difference made by the believer of any religion, he does not have the sense of the nuances. In some religions is possible that the divine reality to be reckoned as not possible to exist except within nature, as forming the heart of the nature itself, as something constituting, together with the nature, a functional whole. But even in those cases the conscience of the believer discerns between divine and nature and it attributes to divine also another capacity than only that of maintaining the constant and automatic order of the nature.

This orientation of the religion towards something differing from nature and superior to nature, it is confirmed by all of them who see in *sacred* (Otto) or even in *magic* (Ley Brühl) a constant element of the

religion. Even by Blaga (“It is almost unavoidable, therefore, that the magical idea, of an incomparable polyvalence, to gush up, at least in the hypothesis of the *sacred*, in the componence of any religion” (Blaga 1942(1): 199). We specify, in the same time, that this orientation towards something distinct from nature and superior to nature, it cannot be found in religion as a sufficient and self-standing element, but only as attribute of the clear or more obscure character of the realities forming the object of the faith. By that, the religion raises itself above the magic. Even if there can be found, sometimes, purely magical practices, they do not constitute the religion by themselves. The presence of the magic in connection with almost all religions, we reckon it, in this ideas connection, only as one of the proofs on the character of being different from nature, of the religious realities. The magic is the lowest element of the religious faith; the magic increases as the conscience about the person-like character of the divinity weakens, or as the man’s conscience detaches some mysterious powers from the ray of the divine will. It is not less true that the also the magic has a character that differs from nature and it is superior to nature. The practices of constraining the magical power are, actually, a conformation of the man to some prescriptions of that power. The character as being different from nature, of the realities forming the content of the religious preoccupations, it is obvious also in the fetishism and the totemism of the primitive peoples, for they do not reckon the whole nature as spring of mysterious forces, but only certain object and animals. The same tribes then change the objects adored as fetishes, under the impulse of the conviction that the mysterious power has changed its domicile.

(…)

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4. Finally, a fourth specific and necessary element to any religion is the faith in *the self-revelation of the divine reality*. It is a universal conviction at the believers of all religions that the divinity revealed itself

and that the divinity is revealing itself, and the news about the divinity are not a construction of the mind or of the human phantasy, or a self-revelation of the human spirit, as Blaga said.

(…)

We have in this element of the religion a new point radically differing the religion from any metaphysics. While the metaphysician ascends from the seen realities towards their foundation through deductions and imagination, the religious man believes that those realities uncovered themselves. Here it is shown again that the religion cannot be reduced to metaphysics; we are ascertaining again, that the religion cannot live, unlike the science, the art, or the metaphysics, out of the conscience that is a product of the human spirit, a self-revelation of the human spirit, but the religion needs the faith that the divinity has unveiled itself. Actually, the faith and the self-revelation form a whole. The faith cannot take place where the man knows that some data are only the product of his own spirit, but the faith is necessary where the man must affirm, with certitude, that there is a reality beyond his own spirit. The science does not need faith, for the science occupies itself with the surrounding nature, with the nature's component elements which can be experimented through senses and apparatuses. The metaphysics does not need faith because everything it projects towards sight it is a product of the own spirit, and it is not necessary one to believe in his own spirit. Even when a metaphysics does not have a subjective character as in case of Blaga, but it affirms certain objective foundation elements, such metaphysics still reached to affirm them through some judgments of the human spirit, or they are seen in a continuity to the nature's order (but neither in this last case are they determined through an experiment, but only through deductions). The metaphysics of any kind, it cannot have any certitude, because of not admitting a direct encounter with the ultimate reality through the spontaneous self-revelation of that ultimate reality and, on the other hand, it is not possible to submit this ultimate reality to senses or to be detected by apparatuses, as in science, for it is at the non-experientable

foundation of the nature. The metaphysics always remains a product of the human spirit, more or less based on real hints. Aware of that, the metaphysics cannot have any certitude. Only a materialistic *metaphysics*, one that does not admit anything but what can be experienced, it can have a certitude. But this is no longer a metaphysics as such. The certitudes on the ultimate realities, when these ones are conceived as non-experientable, as being beyond the material plan, one cannot have it except through the rushing in of theirs in front of the human spirit, through their self-revelation. That's why the faith in certain ultimate realities and the self-revelation of those ultimate realities, they belong together, as we have seen the faith and the non-automatic, supra-automatic character, namely person-like and supra-natural character of the divinity. The religion affirms both of them, for it forms a whole. The metaphysics is not basis on any of those. The metaphysics is content with knowing about itself that is more or less a product of the human spirit. By that, the metaphysics does not cease to exist. The religion, in order to exist, it needs faith, namely it needs revelation.

The metaphysics, in principle, as one that wants to be a work of the man, it does not reckon itself as a means of entering the contact with the ultimate reality, that is its object; the metaphysics realizes that in its frame there is not done a real transcending from the cogitating spirit to the ultimate reality. The religion, though, it lives out of this certitude of a real transcending, of an encounter with the divinity. The religion reckons as right that metaphysics, as effort of the human spirit, it realized its incapacity, consequently the human spirit's incapacity, to launch by himself in front of the core of the ultimate reality. The religion knows about metaphysics, or about the human spirit in his own efforts, what this spirit himself knows about himself, that he can, by his own powers, at most to sketch some suspicions, more or less rich and verisimilar, about the ultimate reality, but he cannot gain a full certitude. But just because of that, the religion's certitude about the ultimate realities it always is accompanied by the conviction about their self-revelation. If the human spirit cannot give this certitude to himself – and a proof for that is the

heap of his metaphysical constructions – it will turn out that that certitude cannot come but out of a contact with that reality, due not to the human spirit but at the initiative of the ultimate reality. There is in all religions, unlike in metaphysics, the certain conscience of a real transcending of the spirit, and not through spirit but through the divine reality. “Unlike metaphysics, there is no real religion, says H. Scholz (q. w.: 89) which to be felt as human product. Any non-falsified religion affirms that is a connection bridge with the divinity, one based not on a human caprice, but on the divine revelation. And let this remain well clarified: a connection with the divinity, not with some cosmic or physical energy, like Mister Spencer says”.

If Blaga reckoned as right the conscience manifested by the human spirit in metaphysics, by admitting the real possibility that the human spirit can really encounter the transcendent, by his own initiative, why does not Blaga reckon as equally right the conscience manifested by the same spirit in religion, by admitting the spirit’s transcending at the initiative of the divinity, namely of the ultimate reality?

Anyway, the religion is so radically different from metaphysics and from the other branches of the human culture because it cannot be treated with the criteria which those branches judge according to, without being destroyed what the religion has characteristic.

(…)

Blaga admitted that all religions claim, on their behalf, a divine revelation. But he was content to ascertain this fact without any further analysis. In the definition he gave to religion, he did not take in account this fact, but he brought religion to a common denominator with the metaphysics, though the metaphysics does not claim that is based on the divine Revelation, but it admits that itself is a product of the human spirit. But, in order to understand a reality, one is required to research the meanings and the causes of all sides it presents; overlooking some important sides it will not be an explanation.

Blaga committed also a mistake of judgment: by ascertaining that each religion claims the divine Revelation for itself, he drew, without

further analysis, the conclusion that no religion is right. But thus, he overlooked the possibility that all religions could be right. (…)

(…)

On the common and true fund of all religions and about the diverse washed out and distorted sorts of this fund, as also about its integral achievement in Christendom, we are going to treat in the followings.

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5. Now we must mention one more element composing the definition of the religion, namely in the common fund of the universal religiousness.

This element is a certain expectation, trust, and hope, which the man ties himself with, to divinity, regarding his destiny. Clearer or less clear, the believers of all religions hope in an eternal continuation of their existence, with the help of the divinity and by exercising some practices which they conform themselves through, to the will of that divinity or to the order established by that divinity. In addition to that, almost always, the believer expects also some help from the divinity, during the present life.

The human universal conscience *expects* and *believes* in a man's salvation from under the grinding power of the nature or of some evil forces, in an elevation of his destiny above the perishing destiny of the things from within nature. The *expectation* is a deep instinct of the human nature; the *faith* is the mysterious power which the man is given with, together with any religion.

All these five elements of the religion hold together as in a block. There is no religion which not to present, regardless how faded, all these five elements. One cannot give the religion and explanation as being a specific reality, and as being so important to the human soul, without taking those five elements in account. Through these five common elements, each religion pleads for the truth of all other religions.

But when we say that these five elements belong together, we also understand that among them there is a tight connection. One is explained through others. Faith without person-like divinity and without revelation cannot exist, as we have seen. Also, there cannot be faith in the absence of a purpose, as there is that of saving the existence. All the elements actually express the conviction about a certain special connection of supra-automatic character, a person-like character, that exists between divinity and man, in the interest of saving the man.

This universal conscience of the mankind must be seriously pondered upon. Here must be a hidden truth. It is the truth of any religion. But no other religion answers these expectations and convictions so clearly as the Christian religion does. This is the truth of the Christendom, in the light of which are underscoring the insufficiencies of the other religions.

But if there is no religion which not to be a block of the five elements, that will not mean that some of the five elements cannot be found in other phenomena of the human spirit. The elements no. 2 and 5 can the met in some metaphysics too, and the element no. 3 can be met in the magic taken by itself (in religion, this element no. 2 is rather included in the element no. 2). But they do not have religious power except in connection with the elements no. 1 and 4, with the faith and with the *revelation*. For instance: a God Who does not reveal Himself, He loses some of the spontaneous, person-like character. God reveals Himself not only in order to make Himself known to the man, but also for showing the man that God is interested in man, and the person-like quality capable of claiming the whole man. The revelation is not only something that explains the birth and the existence of the faith, but it also gives a certain qualification to the divinity.

Only a *believed* and *revealed* divinity is a divinity of the religion.

The faith and the Revelation are specifically religious elements, and they give this character also to the idea of divinity. (Of course, upon the connection existing among the five elements we could tarry further on, in order to clarify an entire series of problems).

On the other hand, the elements no. 2, 3 and 5, they form the *content* of the religion and the elements no. 1 and 4 form the human act and the divine act which the elements no. 2, 3 and five become through, a content of the religiousness.

The great questions regarding the truth of the religion will be focused, consequently, on the problem of the faith and revelation. We are going to see that there is a tight connection between them. One cannot explain the reality of the faith without revelation. On one hand the faith is the most profound reality of the human being, and it is the surest sign of a transsubjective reality, but, on the other hand, the faith cannot exist without this objectivity, namely without revelation. The faith is both a human and divine reality. The faith has a real bipolar character. The reality of the revelation is included in the existence of the faith. These two problems are one together. But let's not anticipate. Let's proceed methodically.

V. The Truth of the Religion

We understand through the truth of the religion the objective reality corresponding to the religious conscience. Is there any truth of the religion? And: how can one cross from the definition of the religion, namely of the universal-human religious conscience, to be objective reality corresponding to it?

The five element which we ascertained about, that they necessarily enter the constitution of any religion, they show us the truth sphere they claim as represented not by a religion or another, but by all religions together. The problem of the religion's truth by and large, it is reduced therefore to this common sphere of the universal religiousness. The fact that certain things are confessed by the conscience of the entire mankind, it provides those things, from the beginning, with an advantage in debating the problem of the truth, in comparison to other things confessed by a religion or another.

For now, let’s place face to face the truth sphere claimed by all religions and that one admitted by Blaga, in order to see, in the first place, the differences, and in the second place, if not the reason that made Blaga to admit his truth sphere does not equally provide as much as it does the truth sphere claimed by religion by and large.

Letting aside the certitude of the religion which represents the perceiving apparatus of the objective realities and postponing the special questions raised by its mysterious existence, we ascertain that the religion by and large claims the transsubjective reality of a divinity differing from nature, having a certain interest in man and able to manifest that interest, and that is shown in the universal-human conscience about the revelation of the divinity and about a certain help the divinity gives to the man in order to save the man; so, a somewhat person-like divinity, taking a positive care of the man. Any religion claims, it has the certitude of knowing that much.

Towards this truth sphere of known reality of the religion, which is the truth sphere admitted by Blaga and which he affirms that there cannot be anything above it?

Blaga affirms that we cannot know about the transsubjective reality except the fact that exists. More than that, we cannot know anything. The transsubjective reality remains an impenetrable mystery. Everything going through our mind is a subjective construction, a myth. (Blaga built such an image of the reality in front with a Great Anonymous, Who, on one hand, He cut off from the periphery of His being small and countless little pieces which the things and the people are composed of, and on the other hand, He fearfully watches lest any creature will know something out of the reality, or lest any creature will raise to endanger His domination. But this construction of Blaga must also be reckoned as a myth that is inconsistent and incompatible one to any moral order).

So, there is an obvious difference between the truth sphere of the religion and the truth sphere at Blaga, so that there cannot be either from this point of view about some agreement between Blaga and Christendom, once there cannot be any agreement between Blaga and

any non-Christian religion at least. Blaga does not admit that is possible to be known even this minimum that is common to all religions, so that, in his opinion, even this common minimum is an illusion. (…)

So, while any religion affirms with certitude that the reality has in its front a power or several power having a somehow person-like character, bearing a positive interest favorable to the man and revealing its existence and this interest, Blaga says that we do know absolutely nothing, except that there is a mysterious reality.

Let's pass now to the question: where does Blaga know from, even the least he knows, namely that there is a transsubjective reality?

We have seen that Blaga admits two kinds of knowledge: the quasi-knowledge and the knowledge-negative.

About quasi-knowledge he says that *it keeps the place* of the transsubjective reality, it is a cognitive sign of that reality.

Where does Blaga know from, that this knowledge *keeps the place* for an objective reality, that is an inadequate sign of that reality?

Blaga says:

"We always notice the same transcendences, *the same objective realities*, and we answer that with *the same conscience phenomenon*. To one and the same mysterious objective reality our subject answers with the sensation of *red*, and not with the sensation of *green* or *yellow*. So, there is a constant correspondence between a certain allegedly cognitive conscience phenomenon and a certain transcendence. "The conscience phenomenon can be reckoned as cognitive sign of a transcendence only when the individualized subject reacts *constantly* to the same transcendence. If the individualized subject answered the contact with one and the same transcendence on any moment with a different conscience phenomenon, if the individualized subject indulged himself to a capricious reaction, there would not be given any possibility for these conscience phenomena to be reckoned as signs of a transcendence… When the individualized subject answers an irrational transcendence, for instance, with the sensation *red*, this conscience phenomenon in transposed through a leap on the plan of the cognitive values, by the fact

that the cognitive subject makes this reaction *constant*. If the individualized subject is unexpectedly engulfed by an irresistible spontaneity and inconsistency, he answered to one and the same transcendence, on one moment with the sensation of *red*, on the next moment with the sensation of *green*, and then with the sensation of *yellow* etc. it would be impossible to transpose the conscience phenomenon in a cognitive gearing" (Blaga 1934: 144-146).

So, to this constant-making Blaga attributes the virtue of ensuring us not only a transsubjective reality by and large, but also a reality corresponding to each cognitive phenomenon of conscience. We do not know what that special reality is like, but the conscience phenomenon constantly answering that it specially indicates that reality. The special phenomenon of conscience is especially triggered by that reality. "The categorial infiltrations into the concrete material have not haphazard character. A material of a certain tenure, of a certain structure, it is dressed up with some organic stability in one and the same categorial mode. If one and the same concrete complex it labelled with maximum constancy with the same categorial name, this categorial mode-name, though subjective, it will become itself sign of the *object. And it is natural to be so: applying a categorial mode depends, for being a constant-made reaction, only and only on the individuality as such, of the object*." (Blaga 1934: [9])

Consequently, the whole certitude of the objective reality by and large, and of some special objective reality, Blaga takes it out of the *constant parallel between diverse conscience phenomena with positive sense and transcendence*.

It is now the moment for us to notice that, from the exaggerated subjectivist perspective he situated at, the argument of the constant parallel is inconsistent. Where does Blaga know that the *transcendence* that he speaks about, it is real transcendence? It is true that in such cases the subject has the conscience of two things: the own sensation

[9] We have not been able to identify the place at Blaga where Stăniloae took this quoted from.

and the transsubjective object. But who can ensure us that the *object* is not, as well, only an emanation of the conscience, as the sensation is? The *object* is somehow, as well, part of the *conscience phenomenon*. The constant parallel of two factors could be a repetition, from time to time, of a sole factor, of a conscience phenomenon under the power of some immanent laws of the spirit; a repetition presenting the appearances of a double.

In order him to be able to admit a transsubjective reality, *Blaga ought to trust the witness of the conscience*. There is no other proof about the transsubjective reality. The conscience is that confessing that the objects appearing to it as different from the sensations caused by objects, are real objects. But we cannot provide ourselves with a proof from beyond conscience. Some people do not believe the conscience's witness. These ones are the radical subjectivists. Others believe. These ones admit the subjectivity of our knowledge. (Lately, one can see a turning back of the philosophy from subjectivism to ontology. To be seen, besides H. Scholz, q. w., especially: Nikolai von Hartmann, *Das Problem der Realitätsgegebenhelt*, Berlin 1931 and John Cullberg, *Das Du und die Wirklichkeit*, Upsala 1932). But this turning back towards ontology has at its basis, in the last analysis, the trust in the witness of the conscience. These philosophers ascertain that there are conscience acts which the reality of transsubjective objects is affirmed through, and the structure of these conscience acts differs from the structure of the conscience acts which such a quality is not affirmed through, by the fact that in the first case the objects are imposed to the conscience as entities which cannot be arbitrarily changed, or reckoned as non-existing, as it happens in the second case; an imagined castle depends on me to be imagined or not, but a real castle forces me to know it or to admit it as it is. J. Cullberg, q. w., p. 186).

Blaga, by admitting that behind the *objects* which the conscience confesses about as not being produced by itself and which differ from sensation, there is a transsubjective reality, and even a very special reality, each time when we experience a special sensation, it proves us

that Blaga *trusts* the witness of the conscience. Blaga, by affirming in a very accentuated manner, that one cannot exit the world of the conscience in order to enter the objects' world, he implicitly admits that he trusts what his conscience confesses him on the reality of the objects. (For the conviction on the transcending towards the reality as mystery taking place in the knowledge-negative, Blaga does not bring at least an apparently objective argument, namely that of the constant parallel. It seems that he simply trusts here the feeling of the conscience. But, probably also this conviction out of the knowledge-negative, he based it too, implicitly, on the phenomenon of the constant parallel from quasi-knowledge).

So, Blaga is, through his affirmations, hostile to the faith, but because of not having any other exit towards reality, her actually practices the faith. By what he affirms he opposes the faith, but by what he does he impropriates, unwillingly, the manifestation of the human soul in religion.

Once we have seen Blaga practicing, unwillingly, the act of trusting the conscience, we could show what the requirement of consistence compelled him like, to admit other conscience's witnesses too, regarding the objective reality. The conscience witnesses not only that *there is an object*, but also *what that object is like*. What basis he admits the first witness on, but not the second witness too? Blaga invokes the diverse results of the science presenting some things as being different from what they appear to us like. (For instance, the matter is shown by science as energy, while the conscience witnesses the matter as solid thing). But it is not excluded that one and the same thing to have several aspects in several stages. The conscience witnesses that aspect that stays on the most prominent plan. Blaga could also challenge the variety of the witnesses belonging to diverse human consciences, regarding the way of looking at a thing. But if it was not admitted in this case too, the applying of the idea of several aspects of the same thing, we could mention that, besides the whole variety of the diverse consciences regarding some details, in general, a thing is perceived alike by all human consciences. A

tree is confessed by the consciences of all peoples as green, as having roots.

Blaga affirms that not the unanimity of the consciences counts as a decisive forum for establishing the transsubjective reality, but only the constant parallel confessed to him by his own conscience. (This affirmation could be brought against Blaga too, by saying that the variety of opinions regarding one and the same thing cannot shake the truth of my conscience about the way it is an object that I perceive). But even if it was so, once the conscience of each isolated individual it confesses not only about the existence, by and large, of diverse *objects* in front of the diverse sensations of the conscience, but also about a certain way of being of those objects, we could see the reason why Blaga would not accept only the first witness of the conscience, and not the second one too, all the more that does not matter to him, as a doubt sign, the variety of witnesses belonging to other consciences about the mode and *object* or another are.

So, Blaga should choose one out of two: not to trust any witness of a conscience, by declaring himself as an absolute skeptic, or to trust any steadfast and non-arbitrary witness of the conscience about the transsubjective reality. The skepticism is nonsensical. The skepticism makes possible any affirmation, even a negative one. Against skepticism rebel the logic and the existence with the tensions from within it, which talk about some purposes. Blaga felt that he could not choose the skepticism. It would have made useless his own philosophy. But the point which he stopped at, when opting for the absolute skepticism, it has been chosen absolutely arbitrarily. Once he trusts the witness of the conscience, he will be forced to admit that he knows more. Thus, by the mistrust he manifests towards other steadfast and profound witnesses of the conscience, he undermines the dignity of being trusted, by and large, and he gives room to the radical skepticism. Kant, when he established what is valid in our knowledge and what is not, he takes heed both at *conscience in general* with its forms and judgments which are universally valid, and the role had by the *thing in itself* in forming the cognitive

contents. Kant raised himself above arbitrary, by providing everyone with the deeper reasons which they to reckon for, that out of the transsubjective reality we know only that much.

The criterion detached, thus, out of Blaga's procedure, it can be formulated like this: one must reckon as real and certain knowledge everything confessed in all times by the universal-human conscience as such, in the case of constant parallel *of the conscience phenomenon* with a *transcendence*.

Actually, the witness of the universal-human conscience about a certain unchanged aspect of the reality, it does not mean else but the fact that the reality presses steadfastly, in an unchanged manner, upon the universal-human conscience, that it stays open to it, that it permanently communicates itself to it, with that aspect; and that the mankind is not formed by hermetically locked monades, but they are in a permanent communication with the reality, and that the reality it *reveals* itself to mankind. The witness of the universal-human conscience about knowing something of the transsubjective reality it means permanently revealing that reality. At least, this is the witness of the conscience. And, beside the idealistic philosophy and the absolute skepticism, all thinkers admit the conscience's witness. Implicitly, Blaga too.

Analyzing the religious phenomenon, we have found four elements (2, 3, 4, 5) which the universal and from ever conscience of the mankind bears witness for. All people have been convinced in all times about the existence of an ultimate reality having some person-like traits, of supra-natural character, revealing itself to the man and having an interest in saving the man from the destructive automatism of the nature. The existence of the divinity and its revealing form the object of a permanent and universal witness of the human conscience. These elements perfectly comply with the norm formulated earlier, for establishing the real content of our knowledge. Even if the conviction about revelation of the divinity were not mentioned among the elements of the religion, but only the divinity's existence was mentioned, though, on the basis of the fact that there is not steadfast and unanimous witness about the existence of

a reality without that reality to reveal itself, somewhat pressing upon conscience, the certainty of the revealing would be beyond any doubt. All the more is this truth strengthened through the explicit conviction of the mankind about divinity's self-revealing.

There will be, therefore, a great variety in the mankind's beliefs regarding the way which the divinity is like, the way which the divinity self-reveals like, the way the divinity helps the man like, or the more precise content of the target which the man is led to. In this regard, it is probable that the mankind's subjectivity creator of myths, the whole its variety of psychic structures and inclinations, it plays a great role. But it is not less true that these lines cross – like a steadfast and universal structure – through the whole chaos of human imaginings. Also, one must remark that the conviction about the divinity's self-revealing and about the positive interest the divinity manifests in the man, they constitute certain specification of the divine being which make the contrary imaginings as non-verisimilar and repudiated by the human conscience. For instance, a myth as that built up by Blaga about The Great Anonymous Who is not moved by any positive and favorable interest in mankind, but He is dominated solely by the fear of being overthrown, this myth is contrary to the general lines known to the universal-human conscience as characteristic to divinity and such myth is rejected because of its absurd and non-verisimilar.

(On the other hand, let's make clear that at Blaga as well, one can notice in a certain way the conviction about the element no. 5 of the religion, namely about a man's superior destiny relatedly to nature, a destiny accomplished, if not with the help of The Great Anonymous, still through an order established by Him. Blaga provides the entire construction of imaginings belonging to the human spirit – in the absence of the positive knowledge – with a purpose. Through them, it is accomplished a major form of the spirit. "The quasi-knowledge means transposing some vital psychic phenomena on the spirit's stave. So, we deal with a *quasi-accomplishment* and not with an authentic accomplishment of the *spirit*" (Blaga 1934: 195). So, Blaga admits a

target of these ordering of the things. If so, it will not be quite everything a mystery. We could ask him: where he knows this target from? He would not be able to answer but: out of the universal-human witness of the conscience. Consequently, The Great Anonymous still wants an *accomplishment of the spirit*. But if there is aimed, in all aspects, a special target with the man, it will not that be hindered, on the other hand, by the fact that, according to Blaga, the individual spirit has no immortality? What purpose would have had this *accomplishment of the spirit* if the spirit had been destined to scatter away after a short earthly existence? There would have been only a play of The Great Anonymous. Consequently, there would have not existed a real target. Blaga was unable not to maintain a rudiment from the universal-human conscience about a special destiny of the man, but he annihilated that through other elements of his philosophical conception. Above all, what accomplishment is that through illusions? Blaga wanted to ensure the richness of the human knowledge by sacrificing its objectivity, as the reality would have been extremely poor, so that the endeavor and the progress in positively knowing the reality had not enriched the spirit in case of being known, of the reality would have been dangerous to the spirit in case the reality had been known. But the reality is so rich and complex than the man never reaches to fully know it, so that there will not be any danger posed by man to God, or posed to man by the fact that the man no longer has what to enrich himself with. It is not necessary to clarify the truth of the knowledge and the man's communion with the reality, in order us to save the man's possibility of enriching himself and or accomplishing his spirit. To the sad life as monad, the man's conscience prefers and opposes to, the life of communion with the reality, especially with the reality of other subjects. The love, that is the heart of our life, it tells us about the need for this communion and for reality. The love is the sign of a real knowledge. It is the love an illusion as well? It is the love a subjective tendency, one unsatisfied by our real encounter with another? Behold where Blaga's philosophy leads to).

Blaga could, eventually, raise the objection that only the objects of the material world offer occasions of constant parallels, and that only they constitute the *transcendences of the sensations*. But Blaga will be less entitled to do such a narrowing, once he affirms all objects' sensitive and tangible features are the product of the subjectivity and, therefore, we cannot speak about the material character of the objects. He could raise this objection in another form too: namely, he could say that only those *transcendences* which are constituted to our conscience and by the contribution of our conscience, as material *objects*, only those *transcendences* offer us occasions for constant parallels.

But the conscience confesses us equally categorically about *transcendences* which - though it does not see and touch them with the senses - the conscience is convinced about them being nigh to conscience as constant conscience-phenomena. Not admitting that the witnesses of the conscience which speaks about the *transcendences* shown materially, it would be an arbitrary procedure. What could be then explained like, the perpetual certitude about the elements composing the religion's definition? What could be explained like, for instance, the difference of experience and certitude had by our conscience simply in front of an *object*, and in front of a human subject, when we feel not only a pressure and an encounter or material order, but also one of voluntary, spiritual order? N. Hartmann demonstrates the existence of an objective reality, by the fact that the cognitive acts referring to that objective reality are bathed in emotions, which we are feel through, a *harshness of the real*. (Die Härte des Realen, see q. w.). When we know an objective reality, our subject is not in a purely theoretical situation, but it is in an emotional one: he endures, suffers, waits for, hopes, fears, desires, wills, loves, hates – and all these spirit states show that he is not alone, but he is in front of something, or he wants or not to be there. Hartmann though, naturally, he tells us that not only in report with the realities presented us materially, we cross through such conscience states, but we do that also in report with some forces, presences, unseen, hidden realities. The objective reality of something does not necessarily consist only of its

visibility, but of its *harshness* which we experience it with. We experience the subject of another in a more accentuated manner, by hating, loving, desiring that person, more than the material objects, or more than that would be possible to be explained if that person consisted only of body. Loving or hating the another, is that only a subjective product of our own self, or it is an imagining of ours in front of a mysterious reality, as it would result out of Blaga's philosophy? Have we not, through them, to some extent, a positive knowledge of an immaterial reality?

So, it turns out that the mentioned elements composing the definition of the religion, are imposed to the human conscience more insistently, more categorically than all the aspects of the seen things. It could be extremely difficult establish a sum of the aspects of the seen things, around which to exists a unanimous and definitive agreement of the conscience of the whole mankind. But the few elements one can find in all religions meet this universality of convictions. Thus, one can say that the mankind is more convinced about the existence of a person-like divinity who is self-revealing, than about all the seen aspects of the things. We can base this affirmation not only on the universality of this conviction, but also on its depth within any human conscience. There is not conscience, idea, affirmation, which to be upheld by such a deep conviction – and this is the faith – as the affirmation of the knowledge about the existence of a divinity that self-reveals to the man and it manifests a positive interest in man. (About this side of the depth of the conviction about the existence of God, we are going to treat a little further).

The universal extension of the religious conviction is a proof about a real and *adequate* knowledge, within some limits, about the divinity. There is a divinity and this divinity is, by and large, as the whole mankind is convinced about: a divinity that is superior to automatism and to nature, and that self-reveals to the man out of positive interest in man.

Between what composed the content of such a universal and deep conviction - the most universal and the deepest conviction – and the objective reality, there must be an adequation.

Blaga would want, seemingly, to admit a certain adequation between a sensation, an idea, of an imagining or ours, and the reality, because of admitting that each of those are due to a certain transsubjective reality. “Any variations in the content of the knowledge are due, in the case of a maximum reactive stability of the subjective factors, exclusively of some variations in the content of the transcendence” (Blaga 1934: 145). But, further on he does not specify the nature of this adequation. He was not able to, after he affirmed that we cannot know anything from reality, except that there is a mystery. The idea of Blaga corresponds to the following image: there is within our spirit a sum of pieces having a certain form. Externally to our spirit, there is, likewise, a series of unknown pieces. Between each internal and external piece there is such a report than a certain piece from within our spirit can be set in motion by a certain piece from outside our spirit, which it corresponds to it in a way that we cannot know.

We can formulate two observations about this theory: first, if we cannot know about any of the external pieces but the same thing, namely that that is a mysterious reality, then everything that is outside us will be reduced to a dark mass of mystery, and then what will be Blaga able like, to tell us that there are differences among the external pieces? Should be trust on this the fact that our internal pieces vary? But this would mean to draw a conclusion from something internal towards something external, and then, why should we not draw any other conclusions either?

Secondly: but even on the basis of that sole conclusion, it turns out that there is a certain adequation between the pieces of our spirit and the pieces from outside our spirit. There is a greater matching between certain external pieces and certain internal pieces.

It is true that Blaga withdraws his admission of that adequation, by affirming that that adequation is only an illusion. Through that adequation, The Great Anonymous attempts to deceive the man, so that the man no longer would attempt to surpass what he already knows. The man is closer to reality when stops believing in any adequation existing between his knowledge and reality, namely when he accepts the reality

as a mystery. “The illusion of the adequation is a moment that is added for defending the existential mystery. And look at what is that done like: the cognitive subject, by lending to a dissimulative adequation the aura of the adequation, he will no longer feel himself tempted to search for a *mystery* behind a dissimulative revelation” (Blaga 1938: 107). We have here a new contradiction at Blaga. This contradiction comes out of the same arbitrary attitude on one and the same problem. On one hand, as we have seen, Blaga trusts the witness of the conscience about a difference among the external pieces which are moving the ideas, the imaginings, and the judgments of ours – this is because, according to his Lordship, we cannot have a look upon the objective reality – and on the other hand he declares that the witness of the conscience about a certain adequation, between what we know and the external pieces, it is an illusion.

We are noticing, here too, a mistake. Blaga did not establish a well-founded and generally valid criterion, on the basis of which to be certain witnesses trusted, while others are not. On one hand he affirms that the conscience about an adequations is an illusion, on the other hand he trusts it. But he does not tell us why once he trusts it while another time, he trusts it not.

The contradiction comes out of not specifying the term *adequation*. It seems that Blaga understands by adequation an exact copy of an external piece through an internal cognitive piece. Probably because of this reason, he rejects the *adequation*, while he still admits a certain *correspondence* between certain external piece and certain internal piece, the internal piece being set in motion by the external piece.

But, despite the whole arbitrariness staying at the basis of this choice of Blaga, lets accept it and let’s see if we can use it for what we are interested in. According to Blaga there still is an adequation. And then, if “*any variations in the content of the individual knowledge are due*, in the case of the maximum reactive stability of the subjective factors, *exclusively to some variations in the content of the transcendence*” then the diverse knowledge styles will no longer be

exclusive expressions of a subjectivity, but they are due to certain aspects of the objective reality. In this case the objective reality no longer appears as one and the same uniform mass expressed by each style according to its subjective conformation, but the objective reality itself, by having diverse sides and aspects, it works with some of them upon some stylistic matrixes, and with other of its sides and aspects it works upon other stylistic matrixes. Consequently, the origin of the diverse styles stays in the objective reality and not in subjective causes, because in the case these spirit's structures had their cause in subjectivity, we would not be able to imagine what the diverse pieces of the objective reality can find like certain pieces of the spirit as more conform with themselves than other pieces. Anyway, in the forming of this subjective structure it has been dominating a superior care for conforming them to the diverse pieces of the objective reality.

So, not only – by and large - the stylistic structures are placed within spirit by the objective reality (The Great Anonymous), as it would turn out of Blaga's conception, but each stylistic piece and, above all, each style, it has been shaped under the power of and by taking in account the conformation of the external reality's pieces. Any style, religious etc. it expresses, consequently, only a side of the objective reality. Blaga will not be able to escape from certain adequation, be it even a negative adequation, if we do not want to adopt an absolute skepticism, also by renouncing to affirming an objective cause specified for each spiritual act. But, further on, besides the whole difference among diverse stylistic matrixes, we notice in the conscience of the entire mankind the persevering presence of some fundamental elements, then, of course, to those elements will correspond, in objectivity, something that works upon all spirits, something equally fundamental to the objective reality, something that is possible not to be unveiled to everyone and not continuously staying at the gate of all consciences. As such, it is presented to us, as we have seen, the conviction about an ultimate reality of person-like character revealing itself to the man out of interest in man's destiny. To this universal and permanent conviction,

one that is fundamental to the human conscience, there must be something corresponding in the objective reality, something that holds within reality a such permanent and fundamental place in report with the other elements of the objective reality which act upon some variable factors within the human subjects.

To these few religious ideas there must correspond in the objective reality something different from the metaphysical ideas, because they appear differently to the human conscience. And unlike the metaphysical ideas, those few religious *ideas* are permanently at work and towards any human conscience, and these virtues are not had by the pieces which set in work the philosophical ideas.

Out of all of these it turns that while the external pieces corresponding to the philosophical ideas do not move us, they are not so active, so powerful, so essential, those setting in movement those few religious ideas have all the mentioned characters. The variety of the opinion regarding the philosophical ideas, as also the freedom of the spirit towards them – the spirit does not feel himself forced to accept them and the soul is towards them as in a game lacking the supreme seriousness – it shows that the adequation claimed by them can be an illusion too, and that the frequent doubt existing towards them has one of its reasons in the rare intermittence which they appear with, and in all the other enumerated reasons, so that it could be justified. The things are different with the few ideas which form the conditions necessary to religion. Here no longer can be about self-deceiving upon the fact that there was in work – or not – an objective factor, namely permanently the same objective factor in producing these ideas. The surety of the correspondence between these ideas and certain external pieces, it is founded on the permanence and on the universality of these ideas, given the tendency of the human spirit towards variety, expressed also through the style varieties.

The styles represent the vails of subjective origin in looking at reality. What is imposed to all styles, exceeding them, it is an objectivity that cannot be veiled. Regardless what strong would be like the veiling

power of the tyles, the few religious elements, because of not being possible to be them made to become a special content of one or another among styles, they prove to be that part of reality imposed us as it is, and it is stronger than the deviation and crumbling force of the styles. In other words, the diverse styles wrap up differently the few truths, but under all veils these truths last as a fundamental reality that does not come out of a style or another, but they form the object itself of the entire activity of perceiving and, by that, of veiling from the style's part. The reality, in its ultimate essence, it presents itself to the religious conscience as the deepest. But it might be that the religious conscience with its convictions, as universal as they are, it is not the deepest conscience and, therefore, its convictions are not the deepest as well. If this is the case, neither the reality seen by it will be the ultimate essence presented to it.

We have reached, thus, at the point where we have to highlight not so much the universality of the religious conscience, but its depth, namely what actually constitutes the faith and what the religious conscience differs through, also as essence not only as extension, from any other gnoseological witness of the conscience.

Blaga admitted that the diverse ideas and images of the spirit are due to some external pieces of the reality which set these ideas and images in motion. Thus, Blaga trusted the witness of our conscience. But he did not ask himself, at all, to which causes it is due the accent of conviction and total adherence to certain cognitive *contents*. Those cannot be due to the simple will of the subject, because the conviction's depth and the adherence's passion take the will too, with themselves, or the will cannot produce them by itself. They cannot be due to some factor from the spirit's stylistic organization, because Blaga implicitly admits that any motion and any variation from our stylistic organization has its cause in objectivity. Consequently, only in objectivity it can have its cause and it accent of adherence and its depth of conviction.

And because, even according to Blaga, in religion the human spirit manifests the most total adherence to reality, but also the deepest

conviction that it is so and not otherwise, it follows that the objective reality itself produces the faith and the total religious adherence. That must be what acts through such a work upon the human spirit, so that to be produced within the human spirit the deepest conviction about the existence of that reality, and to awake within the human spirit the total adherence. Anyway, through another power greater than in all the other cases, the objective reality must act upon the stylistic organization in the religious frame. Thus, in the frame of the religious conscience experiencing the reality or reality's pressure, it is the most accentuated one. The supreme depth of the religious conscience means the supreme intensity in experiencing the reality. The maximum experience of the ultimate reality is lived through the religious conscience, and because the cause does not consist except of objectivity, to the religious conscience is revealed, in the strongest manner, the reality, or the most essential side of the reality among those which are, above all, possible to reveal. What the universal religious conscience experiences is the essence itself of the reality, that is, above all, possible to be revealed to the man. But the religious conscience is not experienced by an indeterminate reality, but by an ultimate reality that is somewhat person-like, one interested in the man's destiny, and one that reveals itself to the man. This escapes, which the man's ultimate essence is unveiled in, they do not scatter the mystery from around that reality. But it is not less true, the fact that not in the opaque and total thickness of the mystery – in the sense Blaga uses that term - the deepest and most universal human conscience experiences the reality, and not this is the ultimate and perfect witness of the conscience about reality.

The mystery and the grace of the ultimate reality are experienced together, are the deepest face which the supreme reality appears under, to us. Only the religious experience can stay in connection with the reality in its ultimate essence, as the most unshakable and universal one.

When we say that the depth of the religious conviction is due to the encounter of the deepest region of our spirit with the strongest and the most essential revelation of the reality, we do not explain the faith only

out of Revelation, but also out of subject. There is within man an impulse towards reality, as Blaga admits it too. This might be the man's deepest essence. But this impulse alone, it does not encounter the ultimate reality; until the ultimate reality does not unveil itself to the man, there will not be faith but unrest. The ultimate reality that sowed this impulse within man as ultimate essentiality, it is not inconceivable that the same reality has given also the possibility of real fulfilling that impulse. If the ultimate reality has sown this impulse within man, it means that the supreme reality itself wants the man to come closer. The ultimate reality satisfied this impulse to the most, through its own revelation, and that transform the man's struggling in the certitude of the existence and of a mysterious presence of it.

For as long as the man has been existing there has been faith too, the man has been partaker to Revelation since ever. The mankind without faith is an impossibility. But faith without Revelation is impossible too. There is a truth both in the theory about the innateness of the religion and in the theory of the supra-natural origin of the faith, both completing on one another.

For the faith – and therefore the Revelation too – have been existing since the beginning, the faith is received from antecessors. But in the same time, in a broad sense, it takes place a permanent Revelation, each man mysteriously experiencing the pressure exercised by the ultimate reality upon his conscience. Out of all manifestations of the nature and of the soul, the conscience perceived the divinity's Revelation. For this one does not take place as a phenomenon isolated form the cosmic, animal, social, political etc. phenomena, there have been created certain theories which see the origin of the religion in divinizing the nature's forces, or some animal, or the society, of the political chief etc. In reality, the religious experience distinguishes the divine from all these elements, though it can experience the presence of the divine in connection with all of these.

We are not entering here the analysis of this experience and its more detailed highlighting relatedly to the simple experiences of the

cosmic or human natural. Any religious man knows the difference between them. In the religious experience there is a conscience of the divine's mysterious presence. "The fundamental religious experience is the conscience of a divine presence as gushing up through the conscience about the world" (Scholz, q. w.: 108).

Though, at some intervals, when the religious certitude weakens and the perpetual revelation - in a broad sense – is does no longer suffice, there occur the more accentuated revelations, ones which are more highlighted, and they produce an intensification of the faith.

We want to say a word also on man's total adherence to religion in order to accentuate the adequation between the religious-universal conviction and the ultimate reality, and in order to specify its nature.

The today's existential philosophy has clarified the conditions which the man totally participates to something in, so that no region of man's being remains indifferent. The man participates totally to something that is beyond the border of his being, to what does not belong to what he masters or to what he can master. This philosophy has shown that the whole man will awaken himself to what he actually is, intimately (zu einer Eigentlickeit), namely to the state of *existence*, a state that is also a state of real and felt knowledge of what is, only when the man realized the border as whole, and what is beyond him, namely his transcendence. And a border reality as transcendence to the man, it is only what cannot be absorbed within man's content or dominated by man, but that really remains outside the man, as a restraining factor, as an irreducible and sovereign opposition towards man's person.

A reality which the man participates with his rationality to, namely without the vibration of the man's entire being, that reality will not be experienced as a real transcendence.

In the light of this criterion, the metaphysics' ideas do not spring out of the experience or out of the witness of the human conscience about an encounter with the reality. Blaga has never felt any connection with the reality in his philosophy, but everything appeared him as a subjective construction, as a game without responsibility, as a product of

the drowsy state of the spirit. But his mistake is that he extended this sentence upon religion too. But, the religion engages, as even Blaga admitted, the man's totalness, as proof that in the frame of the religion the human being really experiences the transsubjective reality, as the human being cannot experience it in philosophy. Within the frame of the religion the man has the supreme conscience of reaching at the transsubjective reality. Before doubting the reality which the religions tell us about, we must doubt everything. And even if we had doubted about everything we know, the religion's reality would still have had strong reasons in their favor.

But the real transcendence is not experienced by man as a simple and indeterminable presence, as Blaga affirms. The transcendence will be experienced by man as transcendence only if the man experiences, in the same time, the transcendence's claiming power. A numbed, inert, automatic transcendence will not be experienced as transcendence because, despite the whole vastness of such a transcendence, the man will still feel himself superior to it, or, anyway, the total vibration towards it would be meaningless. Blaga opposes to this claiming power of the reality, the reality's character as mystery. Through its mystery the reality kept the man in a tension and disquietude, so that it would satisfy the condition of being a real transcendence. We do not want to show the insufficiency of Blaga's thesis by simply pointing at some metaphysics, as his one is too, which, despite continuously speaking about mystery, they are unable to awake a total participation of the man. The reality seen as mystery awakes and maintains the tension of an infinite and grave passion within man with only one condition: this condition is that, in any case, to be excluded the possibility of indifference and automatism seen as mystery and to count only on its power and its claiming intension.

The total participation, for being a deep and passionate vibration, it is entertained by the sentiment of restraining through transcendence, unlike the game, which is the manifestation of a sovereign, indifferent conscience, of an illusion of the subject that himself is everything, of a drowsiness that does not notice the shaking reality on the side.

But the transcendence restrains us not through substance vastness, because the spirit does not fear the substance regardless what vast substance is like. The transcendence restrains us by claiming us. The transcendence arises above our spirit by its claiming power. By that the transcendence will be real transcendence. By the claiming power the transsubjective reality unveils itself to the man not as something inferior to man's character as person, but as something superior to it.

Besides, we ascertain in the immanent situations too, that the only factor that claims the man, that restrains the man and that makes the man to take total attitude, it is the person of his fellow human. All the other part of nature, they leave indifferent many regions from within man, because he feels sovereign towards all of them, somewhat in a superior situation, a situation of a game, and no nature's parts really restrain the man, because of not unveiling itself to the man as real transcendence, so that it will not engage man's love or hatred.

Only on the line of similar features the man can experience, in religion, the transsubjective reality that engages him totally.

But while the claiming from the human persons is unveiled to us as limited, though total, the claiming from the divine reality has an absolute character and it engages us with an infinite fervor.

The cause consists of - according to some evidences which anybody can easily clarify for himself –, on one hand, in experiencing the supreme sovereignty of the divinity, and on the other hand, in connection with that, in the conviction that itself our own destiny depends on our report with the divinity.

Thus, the total participation of the human being in religion is based on the supreme experience of the encounter with the ultimate transsubjective reality, that reality revealing itself to the conscience implicitly, as having an absolute claiming power upon man – namely a character superior to automatism and to the constant nature – and this claim being exercised upon man on the count of his external salvation. This is the minimum face which the ultimate reality reveals himself under, to the man. And this is the surest among man's encounters with

the reality. The minimum and surest thing we know about reality it is not a simple mystery of the reality, but it is the mystery and the grace and the curse of the reality (as the man conforms himself to reality, or he does not), and the grace and the curse mean the exclusion of the automatism and indifference, or their person-like character, that saves by itself, on the other hand, the mystery of this reality.

If there had not been an external pressure upon the human conscience, exerted by a reality having this character superior to automatism and inert substance, the man could not have had this conscience about the claiming transcendence. Willingly, out of himself, the man does not experience and he does not produce a real transcendence, given the man's egotistic and haughty tendency to bring everything under his mastery. The experience of the real transcendence it is the proof for the presence of the real, claiming, voluntary, likening to the fellow human's person but infinitely superior to that. (The most serious motif of Blaga for the non-adequation of our knowledge to reality, it is the will of the ultimate reality for deceiving us so that we could not know that ultimate reality. But right through this *motif* Blaga shows that the ultimate reality has a person-like character and, consequently, the human conviction about this person-like character is not inadequate. No explanation of the non-adequation can infirm the adequation of the conviction about the person-like character of the ultimate reality. If there was a non-adequation, there would be somebody interested in causing it. Thus, if there had been only an automatic reality, in continuity to what is nature withing us, there would not have been possible a non-adequation. This does not mean, of course, that the person-like feature of the ultimate reality necessarily implies the non-adequation of our knowledge and convictions.

Let's notice also that Blaga bases his affirmation about non-adequation as a non-demonstrated and non-demonstrable premise, from the point of view of his philosophy: on a certain conception about the transsubjective reality, namely about The Great Anonymous whom he

says that we do not know anything sure about. Then where he knows from that our ideas are inadequate to reality?

What is him based on? - on the witness of the conscience no, because the conscience tells us right the opposite. And when one refuses even the witness of the conscience, there will no longer remain any support for our affirmations.

With these we have raised a few considerations which elevate, we reckon, the truth of these few common elements of the religion, above all truths affirmed by the human conscience.

And we also have come close to the problem of the truth of the Christian religion.

(…)

(*VI. Some Traits of Blaga's Philosophy*)

Blaga's philosophy proves not only to bear the seal of the German philosophy, but also of the German Protestantism, which it has its substrate in. The German Philosophy's subjectivism, as individualism and mistrust in the possibility of knowing the reality and of entering the communion, which is not specific to Orthodoxy, it has is source in the pessimistic Protestantism of *sola fide*, which affirms that all cognitive and ethical powers of the man are definitively destroyed by sin.

(…)

Blaga's philosophy is individualistic and anti-ethical.

(…)

In the philosophy of Blaga there is no communion. The self is locked in himself and in his illusions. He does not know anything from reality; he does not know if there is any fellow human and he cannot recognize any duty of loving his fellow human, because of the example given him by The Great Anonymous that must be reckoned as a fundamental law of the nature, namely being egotist and fearing another.

It is a philosophy based on the theory of the monades.

Blaga does not know the freedom, sin and virtue, obligations and responsibility. These problems which form the very content of the contemporary philosophy are not present in his Lordship's philosophy.

It is a philosophy of the nineteenth century. It is a philosophy which the contemporary spirit – because of facing the imperative force of the great problems and responsibilities towards collectivity and fellow humans – cannot use it.

The duty of the deed, the sin of the egotism, the appurtenance not only through substance but also through responsibility to the national communion, the truth in the contribution of the personal effort to modifying the destiny, the generous and sacrificial spirit, equally numerous slogans and tendencies which have been once for ever discovered by the human conscience, are impossible to be heard in the philosophy of Blaga.

The fatalism, the monadic individualism, the ethical indifferentism, or rather the anti-ethical tendency, the irresponsible dreaming, these are the characteristics of Blaga's philosophy, and they are directly opposite to the heroic, communitarian, altruistic tendencies of the young people of today who are borne by a great trust in the communion with the reality.

The today's philosophy palpitating under the heat of the great communitarian and social problems, it has trust in the encounter of the man with the reality and in the man's duty to encounter the reality and to influence the reality, or to listen to the reality's commands with a sentiment of responsibility. To Blaga it is impossible the encounter with the reality, since it is impossible even any positive knowledge about reality.

Blaga often speaks about spirit in his books. But there is nothing more absent in his books than the spirit is. It is a philosophy of the substance, namely of the fatal and automatic unfoldings. Spirit means freedom and capacity of decision, it is sin and virtue, it is responsibility, it is grace and curse, it is relation of love, it is capacity of determining one's own destiny and others', the spirit is beyond and else than automatism and fatality.

Blaga's philosophy sounds in our times as a tardive rumor about some obsolete times, which did not discover the reality yet, with its great commandments and in its great complexity from today. Far from anticipating a new era, resembling to the Middle Age, as it claimed, his philosophy is a tardive apparition of the rationalistic, individualistic, and anti-spiritualistic past. Blaga's philosophy is like a poetry, built by a soul with predisposition of poet, and tending to explain, mostly, the poetical creation.

This philosophy will keep, of course, an importance in the history of the philosophy in Romania, as an *interesting* system together with other *interesting* systems.

(…)

Blaga's philosophy justifies the grossest egotism, the avoidance of any moral norm recognized as valid and necessary, and it declares the generosity and the love as weaknesses.

(…)

VII. The Cosmology of Blaga

(…)

(*After reading the new book of Blaga entitled The Divine Differentials, which Blaga presents in his theory on the origin of the world, we think that we can affirm the fact that the corner stone of Blaga's cosmology is the thesis that The Great Anonymous, by having a power overwhelmingly exceeding the whole power from within world, He can self-reproduce ad infinitum, without getting exhausted. The highest result of the original Being cannot but give existence to some Beings totally equal to Himself and that in an unlimited number*.)

But The Great Anonymous avoids to unchain these possibilities of His, in order not to appear multiple centers with autonomous existence, because of that would equal a true anarchy.

Carried away by His egotistic care for saving His position as unique center of everyone, The Great Anonymous restrains His major

possibilities of doing and He grants freedom only to the most modest among those possibilities. So, the world is not a positive result of God, but it is the result of a negative act, and act of abstinence, of forcing Himself not to give birth to some existence equal to His own. “The will of The Great Anonymous, as effort, it is not directed towards creation, but it has as objective just to prevent a too great creator amplitude” (Blaga 1940: 31). So that, the fact that the world has been born it is the proof that there are not several (more than one, o. n.) person in God, and that the Father has not decided to create some images equal to Himself, because, if that was the case, He would no longer be able to stop Himself (?)[10] only to two persons equal to Him.

The world is not created by God out of nothing, but the world is some emanation, some reproduction of Himself. “The creator acts of The Great Anonymous are neither creator out of nothing, nor acts applied upon a given material. The acts of The Great Anonymous are rather improperly called as “*creator acts*”, for they are, in essence “*reproductive acts*”” (Blaga 1940: 30). It is right that in other places, Blaga declares that neither the word reproduction is appropriate for imagining the mode of world’s coming from God, as there is not appropriate any other word or image from the empirical field. But the main idea is that Blaga cogitates the world’s elements as repeating the substance of The Great Anonymous, but not through apparition out of nothing, but as a result of an *emission* out of Him.

The Great Anonymous is a “divine Whole”, of a complexity of structure and or a richness of substance as one cannot even imagine. The reproduction would mean a multiplication to infinite of this “divine Whole”. But by avoiding, though, the plenary reproduction, The Great Anonymous makes to reproduce only His more peripheral areas, but not those of His core. So, the world is a repetition or a more secondary part form the godlike substance, but in other concern is a stumped substance, a degenerated divinity. “Any creator act (only improperly called like that) of The Great Anonymous is, as we have affirmed, under the species of the

[10] Placed in the original text by Stăniloae himself.

possibility, an act of global procreation of His, but under the species of the accomplishing, any such an act is, due to high centralistic rationalities, intentionally *choked up* at maximum. The non-analogy between The Great Anonymous and any direct or indirect result of the creator acts it is *overwhelming* and *irremediable*, and the likeness remains in shadow and, anyway, neglectable. That is why it seems that the purpose of the man is totally different than making himself alike that one who previously took care of mutilating the man and who, by all measure he has taken, he tends just to preserve the non-analogy" (Blaga 1940: 34).

If we imagine the *divine Whole* as a circle or as a sphere, the world will be a repetition of his outer parts.

But The Great Anonymous goes even further with His precautions. He fears even a partial repetition of His, lest that one to have in itself enough "autarchical potential", sufficient capacity of autonomous existence. That's why He does not allow those outer parts of His to be repeated but in an ultra-crumbled form. And thus, what comes out of the divine Whole are some minimum entities under the report of their substance and structure. Blaga calls them as *the divine differentials*. "Any one of these divine differentials is a minimum substantial, bearer of a structure equal to the absolutely simple segment of the divine structure. The divine differential, by being a minimum substantial, it cannot be but the bearer of a *virtual* structure. From substantial point of view, the divine differentials can be symbolically imagined as a series of dots…" (Blaga 1940: 36). They are smaller than the atoms. They are so slam that they cannot be ascertained by any apparatus. They comprise a structure rather as virtuality. Because the divine Whole has crumbled down, in such pips, extended regions of his being, the divine differentials differ among themselves by the closer of farer place, form the center, which they had into the divine Whole. There is a difference in the structure virtually contained by them. Namely they are heterogenous. Other are like the differentials which the matter is composed out of, and different from those are, for instance, those which the psychic is

composed of. But, because The Great Anonymous ceaselessly reproduces these regions of His being, each category of differential continuously spring out of Him. So, at the basis of the things scattered everywhere, there stay countless heterogenous and homogenous differentials.

The differentials are the only entities coming directly out of The Great Anonymous. All the world's individualities, starting with the atom and up to the man, they are no longer a direct creation of The Great Anonymous, but an indirect one, namely a result of the diverse aggregations, integrations of these differentials, a process which The Great Anonymous no longer had a role in.

Why The Great Anonymous did not directly produce the individuations from within world? Because anything coming directly from God it has an indestructible existence, says Blaga, and The Great Anonymous feared the occurrence of some more complex entities having a character of indestructibility. And any individuation is a more complex entity, with bigger possibilities. The Great Anonymous accepted that the only indestructible entities to be these differentials, and all individuations to owe their existence to the differentials' aggregation, so that they will continuously be crumbled by desegregating in the differential which they have been combined of. Thus, everything that is in the world, except the differentials, it is in a continuous passing, birth and death. This is the fate of each individual conscience too. One cannot speak about an immortality of the soul. "What remains after the individual death, relatedly to the conscience, are these secret psychic differentials, spiritual, heterogenous, but *not the conscience*, neither a pretended *individual soul*, as total and indivisible factor that would have possess a conscience, or it might have been even identical to conscience" (Blaga 1940: 167). So, The Great Anonymous cannot bring to existence individuations, because "By looking at the things purely speculatively, we are forced to think that any creature of being of some massiveness and complexity, by being directly created, through an indivisible act of The Great Anonymous, it would constitute itself in aspects which would made if fearsome. Sucha creature or being, it should be an existence absolutely

crystalized in itself, indestructible, singular, of superlative and even cosmic proportions… Any such being, because is crystalized in itself, indestructible and grown in itself like a to industrious dough, it would be sufficient to itself and, to some extent, even unmanageable. A too accentuated autarchical potential would be a permanent spring of anarchy or of eccentric tendencies" (Blaga 1940: 47).

Such individuations being the repetition of a bigger pieces form the divine Whole, He will not allow His contents to come to existence outside Him, except crumbled at maximum.

Now, how are integrated these infima grains of divinity in order they to give birth to the things and to the beings from the world?

Here Blaga imagines a very complicated and ingenuous machinery, starting from the simplest individuations which are the crystals. In the first place, the divine individuations are integrated in the so-called *formative units*. Neither these ones are experienceable, because of being beyond any means for noticing them. They are the basis of the atoms and of the molecules. A chemical substance is entirely composed by the formative units specific to it. When the process of crystallization of that substance starts, a certain formative unit overcomes all other units and it subserves all their energies. A formative unit is an entity more complex than the differentials are, and the complexity of the formative unit varies depending on the complexity of the individuation staying at its basis. In the formative unit that produces the crystal there is a guiding factor and an energy used by the guiding factor. When in a substance placed in the conditions for crystalizing, it overcomes a formative unit, the guiding factor suspend the activity of the guiding factors of all other formative units, and it takes their energies in its service and it gives the direction of the crystallization. If the crystal is crushed, the guiding factors of the other formative units regain their freedom and energy which were stollen from them previously, and, consequently to that fact, the respective substance can crystalize under the guidance of another formative unit.

More complicated is the process of forming the individuations in the organic world. The formative units from here are more complex,

being composed also by several kinds of differentials. A main factor of theirs is that one that multiplies, out of the formative unit, the cells which the formative units are placed in. A second factor is that that cuts off out of the formative units, produced on at a time, one element at a time out of their guiding factor. B. o. the guiding factor of the formative unit that sets in motion the process of forming an organism, it has in itself, prefigured, all the organs and the forms of the organism. But the first cell produced by that formative unit for a partial organ it will no longer have in it the formative unit as guiding factor, but the form of that organ.

This really ingenious theory (though it belongs rather to the domain of the science than to that of the metaphysics and it should be waited for the science's word said at the appropriate time and that could be different), it allows Blaga to explain both the teleology which each individuation grows up with, and his Lordship's so-called para-finalities, namely, for instance, the monstruous apparition to some organisms of more organs than necessary. In principle, the respective organ matches the organism in question, but appearing it in double number does not match that organism.

The differentials are integrated with one another on the basis of their inclination towards one another, by the fact that they have been cut off out of the same divine Whole. They are complementary to one another. Usually, there are integrated the creatures which match the best to one another and then they produce the most final creatures. But not always the principle of the best matching is the one dictating, but, under other influences, there can be integrated also differentials among which there is only a sufficient or a minimum matching, and that produces types of creatures, or individuals manifesting some shortcomings.

The integrations processes which offer Blaga also the ground for accepting the species' transformism (on a given moment, when the circumstances require it, to the formative unity of a species will be integrated a new differential so that will produce a first exemplary of a new species), are exclusively led by the complementariness between

differentials and the environment's influences. Like so it is explained also the finalism of the beings from the world and the reciprocal matching among the parts and components of the cosmos. The Great Anonymous does not intervene either in this *indirect* creation of the world.

Blaga strongly argues the finalism against the mechanist theory. Wrong it we imagined that the finality of the diverse individuations was the product of a being. The things and the beings, even the human beings, are organized on a purpose in somewhat automatic mode. Everything takes place according to laws and influences which exclude the will, as in a vast machinery. Therefore, the human life unfolds automatically as well. "Principles, as there is that of the fatalism of the falling, *of the freedom*, of the matter etc., they actually limit outwardly the divinity, and they multiply in an inopportune manner and against the own postulates, the explicative elements" (Blaga 1940: 156).

There could not have been about a sin from the man's part, if the man had been a creation of the finalist determinism.

In this connection we have to remark the paradoxical aspect which the man is conceived under, in the system of Blaga. On one hand the man is a being living in the horizon of the mystery and for revealing that mystery, being on the most advanced position towards The Great Anonymous. This is explained by the fact that the man's spirit is compose of the differentials cut off out of the closest region to the divine Whole. On the other hand, though, just that makes The Great Anonymous to fear the man because the possibility of the man becoming like Him. That is why The Great Anonymous took measures so the man cannot become consummate in knowledge and power. The act which The Great Anonymous brakes the man's knowledge is *the transcendent censorship*. The means used by The Great Anonymous are the so-called stylistic categories from the man's subconscious, under the force of whose, the man is forced to crook and narrow everything he could know and reveal, on the measure of these templates. Even the man's means for knowledge and expression are an impediment in his way.

The man is, therefore, in a contradictory situation. The divine superior nature of the differential which the man is composed by, it pushed the man towards God, this being, in the same time, a tendency of the man to take the place of God, but God's fear rejects the man each time pushing him downwards. The history, the frame and the expression of the human life, it is therefore a game of The Great Anonymous. There is no moral problem to the man. Notions as there are: the sin towards The Great Anonymous, the love, the veneration, are meaningless in the system of Blaga. About his tendency of taking the place of God, a tendency that stays in the nature of the divine differentials which the man is built of, the man must not be ashamed of. And the brake keeping the man from ascending on the higher level, must make the man very discontent of The Great Anonymous. Everything must be therefore reckoned as a struggle of the man with God, which the man is always defeated in.

But we do not want to anticipate our considerations of Christian order upon this philosophy, because we are going to speak them up a little further.

Finishing the presentation of the cosmological ideas of Blaga, we are quoting here a few rows which clarify his conception about history: "The history is, in the metaphysical order and in the order of the finalities of the existence by and large, this man's way of living and of creating as a dangerous being to The Great Anonymous, and the man's permanent rejection by The Great Anonymous through His preventive dispositions which He has taken once al for all". "The man's destiny is that of steadfastly living in this offensive always hindered right by its (stylistic) means. The history is, by each of its instants, this existence of great intentions that breaks in itself, because the only means available to it always turn against it. The history does not have a purpose, a terminus, which it would aspire to and which would be its end somewhere in the future" (Blaga: 1940: 188-189).

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We do not intend to submit in these rows, to a detailed and thorough critique, the cosmology of Blaga. The frame of a short review is not appropriate for such a purpose.

(…)

By and large one has to ascertain that the philosophy of Blaga, as it unveils itself in its foundation lines, it is a philosophy of the things and of the impersonal forces (eine Philosophie der Sachen), despite promising, at its beginning, to be a philosophy of the mystery of the person-like being, and despite bringing important contributions to highlighting some state of conscience.

Blaga is explaining now, the reality's bases, in a totally intellectualistic and objectivistic manner, with a rationality detached from the total living and from the atmosphere of mystery, by looking, from a sovereign position, at the reality he cuts off and combines alike to a quantity and to some objects. Blaga treats the world and its genesis as a spectator. And "The more we treat the world as a spectacle, the more the world must become, necessarily, metaphysically unintelligible" (Gabriel Marcel, *Être et Avoir*, p. 22). We do not want to insist upon the fact that on this way Blaga scatters the mystery, through rationality, to the main joints of his system, neither upon the contradiction he ends on this way with his capital idea that the man cannot know the reality because the reality is an impenetrable mystery, and that all his explanations are misinterpretations, deviations, and disfigurations of this mystery. Blaga's philosophy was consistent with itself only if he would present this cosmology, including the conception upon The Great Anonymous, as a such misinterpretation, namely as a gratuitous play of the rationality, accompanied by the surety of the philosopher that the reality *is by no means as he presents it*.

But we want to come back for a little while, to our remark that Blaga's philosophy is a philosophy reducing everything to things, to objects. This character shows it as being an outdated philosophy, one lagging behind the contemporary problems of the philosophical thinking.

The philosophy from after WWI, by following to some sporadic lightenings of the cogitation from before, it concentrates its bewitched attention in the front of the central and true mystery of the existence, in front of the mystery of the persons irreducible to object, the reality of the person imposing almost like a discovery and as a Copernican revolution of the philosophical thinking. The person was analyzed even early on, by Descartes, by Kant, by Fichte, by Hegel, but they saw the person only like a rational *self*, a rationality-subject, so that it was identical to the universal rationality, as some kind of impersonal general power.

Today, the person is a wonderful mystery, but not one less lived or ascertained. The person is a deeper reality, one less definable than the reality and the subconscious forces and categories are. The person is freedom, and sin and responsibility, and need for love and salvation, and the person cannot be comprised with the rationality, but the rationality is in the content of the person and under the power of these pains and tensions. But the great novelty of the contemporary philosophy is that it has discovered the person among persons, u reports, which the intellect no longer has the mastery role into, that one taking in possession a world of objects and above which it could understand anything if it was detached from the clothing of the love and of other features of the person, which the intellect is only servant too, and not their master.

The most wonderful part of the world, which we realize that the field of the objects hangs on and it is sealed by, it cannot be understood by using the rationality but by using those daily profound features of the person, which are so despised by the scholar philosophy. Only in our reports with the other persons the rationality finds its limitation through reality. Otherwise, nothing stays in its way to tailor its world of infinite proportions, or its worlds, for on each day the rationality can build another conception, and each man has its own conceptions. The objects, poor them, they allow to be interpreted, framed in the abusive system of the rationality, in these worlds of dream, of lie, in these Luciferian works, which are as proud as they are inconsistent, and which collapse at their first encounter with the reality of the persons who do not allow to be

framed within those worlds, being scattered as the dreams and the plans conceived on insomniac times and during darkness, they evaporate too when the daylight comes.

As we said before, the person is the sole obstacle and strong witness of the reality. The person reduces us to what we are. But the person also gives us the certitude about the reality of the objects' world and, up to one point, it provides us with the criterion of what we are going to look at objects like.

Behold what Feuerbach says, for the justly saw in this concern and he is a precursor to the contemporary philosophy: "The certitude about the existence of other things… it is for me mediated through the certitude about the existence of other people outside me" (quote from Karl Lövith: *Das Individuum in der Rolle des Mitmenschen,* München 1928, p. 41). Or in Lövith's words: "In love and in the daily feelings there stays the true proof of the reality of what is outside me" (p. 9).

But if the person is a reality infinitely superior to things and to substances, if the person is towards, me too, not an obeying object but an equal factor, and in a certain regard even supra-ordinated to me, if the persons provides me with the surety about the real and external world, do we not have here all the indices that God must not be conceived as a substance, but as person, and therefore the rationality cannot frame God within the categories of objects which we abuse at will, by commanding them what to be like and what not to be like, as we would have been their creators?

All the aspects which we must think at as superior elements in the human person, we must think at than as being within God in unimaginably more grandiose proportions. God is Person so that we cannot comprise Him within the templates of our rationality, but we must get closer to Him and to understand something of Him, as we get closer to the human persons: through love, with an open heart of the whole our being. He does not depend on us, but rather we depend on Him. He gives us through the mysterious way - but one that is not less sure, of the

natural and supra-natural revelations – the surety about the reality of the world and about the mode of this reality.

If God is Person and even with a power unimaginably much exceeding the power of all creatures, I cannot see any serious motif, even of logical order, which to limit His achievement power only to the category of reproduction. On the opposite, if God is so powerful, ad if even the creature is achieving on many ways, it will be more logical to admit that God can also create out of nothing. The creation out of nothing is one of the most important pieces of evidence of His overwhelming power and, in the same time, it brings the divine achievements out from under the stigma of monotony.

It lacks the plausibility also the idea that The Great Anonymous, if He decided to reproduce Himself, he could not do that except infinitely, and that, by and large, any equal repetition of His, it would be a danger for His centralism.

This idea shows that Blaga conceives God as lacking two fundamental features as Person: the will and the love, not to mention also this odd restraining, through rationality, of the divine possibilities, which must be numerous in an unmatched manner. And a reality lacking the will and the love can be anything, but not a person. Especially the love is the criterion which it is measures according to, a person’s degree of development and of perfection. The more someone lacks the love, the more that person is carried away by uncontrolled impulses and worries, as an impersonal and involuntary victim of theirs. Through love we grow up in spirit, we understand on one another, and we understand ourselves too; the love is the happiness. And the love is communion. God did not receive the growth and the perfection provided by love, in time. God is not a Self Who is locked in Himself, while searching for an exist from that state. God is from ever in Three Persons, through some reproduction – that is right, but not a reproduction conceived according to the human model, as something that takes place in time, but in a way superior mode, superior even to all imaginings of all philosophers who claim they say higher things than Christendom does. But even this reproduction of God,

as manifestation of the eternal love that exists in Him, it is not outside the connection with the godlike will, for God's love cannot be cogitated as something involuntary, impersonal, or automatic. Then, why His will does not have the power to limit the reproductions to a certain number? And the love among the godlike Persons makes them avoiding any egocentrism and any fight among Themselves, that would be such an inferior element even in the human experience. The love provides all of Them with the consummate personality and with the full communion, as two state which cannot exist but together.

On the other hand, Blaga by affirming that at the beginning The Great Anonymous was alone, always thinking at what way Him to proceed on, Blaga introduced the time in the divinity's life too, and that creates enormous difficulties, which we think that is not necessary to indicate here.

God has all kinds of communions: both with persons equal to Himself, whom there is a perfect understand and divine love among, and with created persons, subordinated by a more restricted power of understanding and of love, but a power that is sufficient to make them happy.

Regarding the creation of the world, two aspects stand forwards from the logical premise of the Person character of God – founded on a logic that takes in account the overwhelming realities lived by each of us -: that God wanted to create persons, and he created the persons out of love for staying in communion with them.

Our mind itself tells us that to God we cannot attribute deeds and acts which to represent Him as an inferior being, one submitted to weaknesses and fatalities.

We would have attributed Him such an act if we had reckoned the world as a forced product of His, as a necessary exist from the alternative: total reproduction or reproduction chocked up al maximum.

The only mode of founding the world, according to the idea of God, it is that or producing the world freely, sovereignly, so not out of His being, but out of nothing, and creating the world not out of a caprice,

neither out of some need or fear, but out of love, out of the will to make other kinds of creature too, to be partakers to the happiness of the existence in communion with Himself.

It is an odd idea of God that one imagining Him as a being struggling to prevent the production next to Him of some other reality and thus, everything that flows out of Him would be complex of diminished entities which He always wages war against – until when? -, in order they not to overthrow Him from His throne. We have here the image of a helpless God – an impossible idea that crumbles by itself – Who fights, frown and worried, against his possibilities and against the world.

What inferior and inconsistent is this idea about God, in comparison to the Christian idea about God, according to which God creates serenely, willingly, on a good purpose, a world of free and conscious persons, far from being afraid of them, and He wants to stay in communion with them and He rejoices when seeing them progressing towards Himself so that they become able to receive new and new spiritual gifts out of His limitless richness.

What purpose the world has, in Blaga's conception? None. Everything is endless vanity, a tantalic effort leading to not target.

Especially, (at Blaga, o. n.) the sentiments as the love for God and the veneration of God, are totally meaningless. The sole legitimacy belongs to the intellect's pride, according to Blaga, though we cannot understand what basis this pride could have, while the man was aware of the fact that the fate of the real knowledge is definitively closed, and the fate of each individual is to be scattered in the component differentials after a short life.

Blaga greatly cherishes the spiritual creations and, by and large, historical, of the mankind. But these creations would be impossible without the faith in the personal immortality and in God, without the religious element of love for God. The historical epoque during which the faith and the love weaken, like also the positive attachment and the sentiment of personal communion with God, they have no other role

except to lead to ruin, to decomposition, what created the époques crossed through by faith. Not the intellectual pride creates what is great in history, or that what gives the human succession in time the character as history, but does that the deeper element of the religious attachment to God. The intellectual pride without this faith of religious essence it is a dissolving factor.

And then, what is explained like this persistence of the love for God within the human soul and the fact that only this love maintains the spiritual life and it creates everything that is noble within history? Why only this one is lent with positive efficacy to the intellect that, left by itself, it always brings negative results?

Blaga simply eliminated from his Lordship's observation field this major element of the existence. And the explanation cannot be other than this major element of the existence has its source in God and that on its foundation God created and upholds the world.

There is within man the need for a communion with God and if the man is made like so, we could affirm that this communion is possible and even real to some extent. And this communion is searched for achieving the eternal life and therefore this eternal life must be real and possible too.

Blaga affirms that there is no continuity of the conscience after the bodily death. But this affirmation cannot be based except on an intellectual appreciation that is limited to external phenomena. But our inward tells us something different. And we do not have the right to neglect the indications given us by our internal experience in a question regarding not the matter, but the spirit.

Blaga declares that the soul does not last after death because of not being an indestructible unit, but the soul is a conglomerate of divine differentials. The internal experience, namely the conscience, it tells us the opposite. We clearly discern between the soul's composed contents and the soul's simple hypostasis that is permanently unchangeable. If the souly subject had been composed too, we should have felt that. Why to

build with our mind a theory that opposes the indications of the reality as experienced by the mankind of all times?

But then, how could be explained this presence of the love of God within the human soul and the fact that only this love maintains the spiritual life on earth and it creates everything that is noble in history? Why only this one lends positive efficacity to the intellect which, let by itself, it always brings negative results?

Blaga simply removed from his observation field this major element of the existence. But this cannot be done in a real manner and it requires an explanation. And the explanation cannot be other but that the love has its source in God, and on its foundation, God created and upholds the world.

There is within man the need for a communion with God, and if the man is built like that, we will be able to affirm that this communion is possible and even real to some extent. And this communion is searched for in order to achieve the eternal life and, consequently, this communion must be possible and real.

Blaga declares that the soul does not last after death because of not being an indestructible unit, and because of being a conglomerate of divine differentials. Oue internal experience, the conscience, it tells us the opposite. We operate a clear distinction between the composed contents of the soul and the soul’s simple hypostasis that is permanent and unchangeable. If the human soul had been composed too, we must have felt that as well. Why to build with our mind a theory that is opposite to the indications of the reality, a reality as experienced by the mankind from all times?

Blaga argues this bizarrerie in order to protect The Great Anonymous against the rivalry of the human soul. But we have seen that God cannot be conceived as such a weak and fearful being. If the soul is created but not emanated from The Great Anonymous, then, necessarily, that one who created the soul will be smaller too, and The Great Anonymous will be able to destroy that one too, if He sees it as dangerous for His own existence.

If God, being Person, had as main purpose to create other persons whom He will stay in communion with, and therefore God does not create impersonal tiny pieces, that makes sure that God destined the persons to an eternal life, for in the psychology of the communion is comprised the tendency to be forever with the beloved person. The love of God makes the man an eternal being.

Blaga conceives the soul analogue to the material entities, those, at their turn, being composed of differentials. It is right that he highlights that the differentials which the soul is composed of, they are closer to the center of The Great Anonymous, and not right from the edge as those composing the materials are. But the difference is only of degree, and not of quality. This is for, of course, Blaga must imagine the *divine Whole* as a unitary whole. The crumbled tiny pieces of this *divine Whole* cannot be but gradually different from one another.

Besides, one can see also out of the way Blaga conceives the soul, that he does not qualitatively distinguish the soul from the quantitative entities. Then, the soul conceived by Blaga has not freedom, so that that soul is deprived of the most profound mystery of the existence, that one that differentiates the soul radically from everything that is quantity and mechanical process.

Blaga is a follower of Democritus and especially of the materialistic atomism, which reckoned the world with everything from within it, as a product, through aggregation and desegregation, of the little pieces of matter staying at the basis of all things and which cannot be divided any further, which Democritus called them as atoms and he attributed them some laws guiding, together with the happening, the whole vast and complicated process of the world.

The atoms of Blaga are the divine differentials which he attempted to imagine and to expose them in the book we are analyzing. Of course that his differentials are atoms in the etymological and steadfast meaning of the word, but nonetheless they are quantitative-material too, as little pieces which cannot be further divided, and not in the limited and historical meaning of the word that refers to the little pieces of the last

chemical elements, until recently reckoned as indivisible, and which has been recently ascertained as being composed of protons an electrons which can be detached from the connection that unites them.

Blaga's conception is an atomism rectified in the light of the new results of the chemistry.

Blaga put The Great Anonymous to crumble down, to the limit, extended regions of His, because of the motif that, if He emitted as individuations of a certain substantial and structural amplitude, they would be indestructible and therefore dangerous to His hegemony. Equally numerous inconsistent, illogical and ambiguous affirmations. If The Great Anonymous was able to crumble thus, the parts of His being before emitting them, would Him be unable to crumble them down later?

What could have these ones be more indestructible like, like they had been before? Natural and logical would be if they were more difficult to crumble while being a whole with the whole Hid being, for we know that the power of the whole is a common good of all parts. Our mind and experience tell us that a part broken out of a whole will be weaker, so that the parts of the divine Whole should have been weaker after being emitted, when they started living outside the communion with the Whole.

The question is posed in this way: the Being of the divine Whole is or is not *indestructible*? If yes, what was possible like to crumble certain parts of it before emitting those parts. And, while indestructible, there was still possible to crumble certain parts of it before emitting those parts, why would be impossible to crumble those parts once they were emitted?

Behold on what absurd, unthought premises it is based the whole *ingenious* construction of Blaga about the divine differentials and about their complicated aggregations in order to form the individuations.

(…) (*It is also insufficient*) the motif of the tiring abilities of The Great Anonymous of emitting from Himself ultra-crumbled entities which to form, through complicated processes, destructible individuations. The motif is not to become these individuations dangerous rivals to Himself. But what could become these individuations such rivals like, while their

substance is only an infimum piece out of the substance of the Great Whole, and, as structure, it is simple in an unparalleled manner? Their tendency of arising towards The Great Anonymous would bring them, at most, to their reintegration in His content, at the place they had before. Could these individuations increase their substance and structure by themselves, up to competing against The Great Anonymous? Namely, it would the substance increase, or it would there be produced a new substance out of nothing, at the order of these individuations? The first idea is absurd and impossible, while the second idea means creation out of nothing, but Blaga does not admit that. Anyway, the substance produced out of nothing is not like the eternal substance, so that cannot be perilous to The Great Anonymous. By and large, if Blaga opted for one of these theses about the increase of the substance on behalf of the individuations emitted out of the divine Whole, This One could increase His substance in an unmatched greater proportion, so that neither in this way the individuation could reach Him.

The construction of Blaga raises also another bewilderment.

If the divine Whole has crumbled certain part out of Him, and He has sent them out of His being, He will no longer be as a Whole, but He will be diminished, or chipped away. He will no longer be identical to Himself, He will no longer be in the normalcy of His existence, but He will be in a sufferance. How comes that He does not tend to make hie being whole again, to gather back the emitted parts, that being a so natural inclination to any existence”? Blaga could answer that the divine Whole is infinite and the fact that he endlessly emits divine differentials out of Himself, it shows that Blaga must have conceived Him like that. But if He was infinite, how would be fear the lilliputian individuations having their origin in His will?

It is the case now to ask as well: what will happen to the emitted differentials, if the divine Whole continuously emits others? Will they disappear in nothingness? Will they turn back into the divine Whole? Will the world’s substance be continuously multiplied? All this questions which cannot be avoided by Blaga’s construction, and which he cannot

opt for any logical answer to, they highlight even more that his Lordship's system is a fabric of affirmations which are: global, non-reflected upon, unclear, lacking the real philosophical precision and steadfastness.

The disappearance in nothingness is inconceivable, the turning back into the divine Whole it would infirm Blaga's theory about the zeal which The Great Anonymous defends Himself against the raising of the world's parts towards Him. An endless multiplication of the world's substance and other emissions out of the divine Whole cannot be imagined.

If the divine Whole had been emitting the divine differentials from eternity and they do not disappear, we would have had two infinites: the divine Whole and the world. This impossible idea will become absurd when one of the two infinites is conceived as cut off, continuously, out of the other infinite and obeying that infinite. And if the second infinite had not been obeying the first infinite, the fear of the first infinite of the fact that the second infinite could reach equal to the first infinite, it would have been a fact accomplished by eternity and then could have not have been such a fear. And behold that the first infinite is not overthrown by the second infinite. Or it could have been that the second infinite could have not been equal to the first infinite, because it had been *composed* of infimum little pieces, and not of individuations? But the world will form a *whole* regardless what the world is *composed* of.

The disappearance in nothingness could be thinkable only within Christian frame, once the Christian doctrine the creation came from nothingness and it is sustained only by the divine power, and, in case the divine power no longer sustains the creation, the creation will turn back into nothingness.

Above all, the Christian cosmology reconciles all the questions raised by Blaga's construction.

The divine infinite does not need to crumble itself in order to give birth to the world; it needs not to diminish itself, or to infinitely multiply the world's substance, once it creates the world's substance out of

nothing; it has not reasons to be impeded in its generosity by petty fears. The insolvable problem of the substance's indestructibility which forms the world, it is not posed to the divine infinite. Blaga *solved* this question so absurdly. This question is, by and large, the stumble stone to all pantheistic systems.

Blaga's theory on differentials, as the ultimate indestructible entities, it seems not to fit the newer results of the science that reached to identify the protons and the electrons which, in combination varying only arithmetically, but not also qualitatively, they compose all chemical elements and substances. Consequently, not the various differentials stay at the basis of the material world, but the two mentioned atom's parts. But the science does not stop itself here in decomposing the pieces which stay at the basis of the material world. It seems that the science must go further on, reaching a unique reality, which it will be no longer possible to affirm of, except that is a power, and so will be raised the great question if that power is a nothing in its origin while still being something, a nothing due to the absence of any substantial source and a something by the fact as having its basis in a subject who wants it to be. But this is the Christian conception.

We could also ask Blaga: why the Great Anonymous stopped Himself from crumbling the parts of His being at differentials? Are the differentials indestructible by themselves, or by the will of The Great Anonymous? It would be difficult to admit that the differentials are indestructible by themselves. If that was the case, they would escape the power of The Great Anonymous. Sare the differentials indestructible by the will of The Great Anonymous? Why did he stop here? And, if He did not stop here, to what extent would Him go with the crumbling of His particles? Until nothingness? Obviously, not. How will Him turn His being into nothingness?

Behold what hardships and narrowness The Great Anonymous is in, in Blaga's construction. He is rather a Small Anonymous.

All these difficulties and logical impossibilities to not exist to a Christian God fully sovereign upon the substance brought out of nothing.

He is truly great and almighty, as the human conscience e and logics imposes Him to us.

But the whole story about the little pieces cut off, in very small particles, with the little ax, out of The Great Anonymous, and which are then gathered together producing soul, freedom, time, and everything that is depth and mystery within world, it is such a *gross* philosophy, so that he who tarries more in analyzing it remains with a sensation of disgust towards himself. Making out of the spirit's domain a question of quantity and number, it is simply too much.

We do not want to highlight in further detail the shortcoming of this system, which are amazing when we think at the fact that they come from a thinker admired by some many people, for some revelations upon the Romanian soul done by him in his previous works.

We have been mainly wanting to shows how far this system is from the Christian teachings. It hurts us that we had to ascertain that. We were previously looking at Blaga not as at a thinker who could repeat, in slightly rectified forms, the renown systems lacking mystery and depth, but we were looking at him as at the discoverer of some fundamental truths of the life, as they are comprised in a synthetic mode by the Christian Orthodox vision.

We are convinced that there is no vision upon world and life which to comprise in its schemes – for all of them only scratch the surface – so much abyss of real truth as the Christendom does. Any philosopher structuring his system outside the Christian indication, he limited himself, he specified himself, and he instantly got banal. Only when anchored in the Christian systems, a philosopher will be able to ceaselessly fresh and what he says will not be platitudes and limited.

Here is the mystery of the unfathomable depth and of the eternal novelty of Pascal, Dostoyevsky, and Kierkegaard.

It is to us a great pain to us that Blaga hindered the possibility that the Christendom and especially the Romanian Orthodoxy to be able to show, in his Lordship, an exponent of theirs, a lightener of some charming mysteries of theirs. This lost is felt both by nation and by

Orthodoxy, but it is even greater to Blaga, whose philosophy could have been conveyed over centuries, in connection to them. In the hypostasis he unveiled himself for now, neither the nation nor the Orthodoxy can follow him, because they no longer recognize themselves in his philosophy. Let us hope that he will turn back. The history of the human cogitation knew such vivifying and saving turnings back.